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[T]he avoidance of multiplicity of suits by every device,
which is jurisdictionally possible and practically conven-
ient, should be encouraged, and should be one of the main
objectives of procedural administration ....
-Woolsey, J., in Munson Inland Lines v. Insurance Co.
of North America.*
INTRODUCTION
At some point, most American law students gain at least a nodding
acquaintance with the now-hoary case of New York Life Insurance Co.
v. Dunlevy1 and with Congress's adoption of federal interpleader legis-
lation as a result of that decision. In Dunlevy, the Supreme Court held
that a state court personal judgment against a noncitizen of that state
who neither voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction nor re-
ceived service of process within the borders of the state was void for
lack of in personam jurisdiction.2 The result was that a stakeholder
facing mutually exclusive claims to the same asset but unable to join
the claimants as defendants in a single interpleader action in any one
state, because of limits on state courts' personal jurisdiction, could be
forced to pay both claims when sued separately in different states. Such
a situation is intolerably unfair to the stakeholder.' After Dunlevy, the
sole remedy lay in creating a special form of federal court subject mat-
ter jurisdiction through which the stakeholder could require the claim-
ants to interplead. Within a year of the Dunlevy decision, Congress
promptly adopted this solution by passing the first of a series of federal
interpleader acts.
4
In the past several years a situation analogous to that created by
Dunlevy has emerged and, once again, a need exists for a new form of
federal court jurisdiction. The problem, although not intolerable as
* 36 F.2d 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
1 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
2 See id. at 522-23 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877)).
3 See, e.g., Hazard & Moskovitz, An Historical and Critical Analysis of Inter-
pleader, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 706, 752 (1964) (for a legal system to insist on conflicting
commands "is not only a grave matter, it is a subversion of the very basis of the legal
order").
4 Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929. See generally Fullerton, Constitu-
tional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1, 65 n.258, 66 n.260 (1984) (giving history of interpleader statute and
discussing Dunlevy). The current version of the interpleader statute is codified in scat-
tered sections of the federal Judicial Code: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335 (federal statutory inter-
pleader jurisdiction), 1397 (venue for actions within § 1335 jurisdiction), 2361 (for §
1335 actions, nationwide service of process and authority to enjoin other actions affect-
ing stake) (1982).
[Vol. 135:7
MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION
were the inevitable and incompatible obligations permitted by Dunlevy,
is nonetheless both widespread and undesirable. The modern counter-
part to Dunlevy is World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,5 de-
cided by the Supreme Court seven years ago. The problem is the un-
availability of any single forum in which to consolidate scattered,
related litigation-a difficulty that is becoming more and more common
given the increasing number of complex tort actions, such as those
growing out of mass accidents and product liability claims.' As a result
of the statutory limitations on the authority of the federal courts7 and
the constitutional bounds imposed on state systems by World-Wide
Volkswagen, related proceedings arising out of the same events are
often conducted as a multi-ring circus in two or more forums. It is
possible to provide a single forum much more frequently than is now
done. Often, however, such consolidation cannot take place in the courts
of any one state because of the due process holding against state court
jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen.8 In the wake of that case, use
of the article III authority for federal diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion9 must be a major part of any effective, comprehensive solution.
Because technical aspects of federal court jurisdiction rank among
the legal topics having the least political appeal, it is laudable and even
pleasantly surprising that some interest in this problem persists on
Capitol Hill. In 1983 and 1986, Representative Kastenmeier intro-
duced jurisdiction reform bills proposing the creation of a multiparty,
5 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (out-of-state automobile wholesaler and retailer doing no
business in forum state are not subject to products liability suit arising there out of
accident involving car sold by them being driven through state).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 47-49.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 (diversity of citizenship and amount in contro-
versy), 1391 (venue) (1982).
S
[T]he Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate de-
fendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. . . . [Tihe
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the state of its power to render a valid judgment.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (citations omitted) (quoting International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
" See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend. . . to Contro-
versies . . . between Citizens of different States . . .and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.").
These diversity clauses, although usually thought of as the basis for the general
diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), permit-as with statutory inter-
pleader-more precisely targeted federal court jurisdictions to respond to problems that
"grow out of the multi-state nature of our Union and hence present a special basis for
federal intervention." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF Ju-
RISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 378 (1969) [hereinafter ALI
STUDY].
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multiforum federal court jurisdiction.' 0 Kindred proposals have been
advanced at least since the American Law Institute's Study of the Divi-
sion of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in the 1960's."'
The most recent series of efforts began in the late 1970's, coincident
with a growing sensitivity to complex litigation problems, and includes
the detailed 1979 Justice Department draft that became the basis for
the Kastenmeier bills. 2 These proposals have suggested new types of
diversity jurisdiction to provide a federal forum in various situations
when existing limits on federal and state court jurisdiction and joinder
make it difficult or impossible to bring together, in any one court, liti-
gation arising out of multiparty, multiforum disputes. The American
Law Institute (ALI) has undertaken a preliminary study of possible
reforms in the statutes and rules governing complex litigation;"3 the
project's purview includes consideration of changes in federal subject
matter jurisdiction, removal, venue, consolidation, process, and choice of
law.
14
We support the creation of a new federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion for multiparty, multiforum litigation, but we suggest a somewhat
novel approach to defining it. As an introduction to our proposed juris-
diction, Part I of this Article presents a brief history of modern action-
consolidating devices and proposals. Part II discusses the various needs
to be served by a new federal jurisdiction, with an eye to how the fram-
ing of a jurisdictional statute should reflect those needs. Part III sug-
gests that recent proposals have been drafted either more narrowly than
present needs require or without adequate consideration of which situa-
tions should be included in or excluded from such a jurisdiction.
The central contention of the Article, developed in Part III, is that
10 See H.R. 4315, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1986); H.R. 3690, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4 (1983).
11 See ALI STUDY, supra note 9, at 67-76, 375-410.
12 See Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform-1979: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 158-62 (1979) [hereinafter
1979 House Hearings] (draft bill with commentary). An earlier and simpler version
proposed by Professor Alan Morrison appears in Jurisdictional Amendments Act of
1979, S. 679: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 179 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Hearings], and is outlined in Federal Diver-
sity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 179-82
(1978) (statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group,
Washington, D.C.).
13 See ALI Complex Litigation Project, 7 ALI Reporter, July 1985, at 11-12.
Although the senior co-author of this Article serves on the Board of Advisers for
the ALI's Preliminary Study of Complex Litigation, the Article does not represent the
position of the Institute or of any other person participating in the Study.
1 See id.
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,a definition of cases that are to fall within a federal multiparty, mul-
tiforum jurisdiction should be based on defendants' residence: whether
any defendant has a residence in a state other than one where a sub-
stantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.
This basic criterion should hold even if some part of the events in ques-
tion also occurred in the defendant's state of residence. Previous efforts
at defining such a jurisdiction have relied on tests such as scattered
state citizenship of actual or potential plaintiffs, which, we argue, pro-
duce undesirable inclusions and exclusions.' 5 While it would be unor-
thodox to frame federal court subject matter jurisdiction in terms of any
defendant's residence in a state other than the locus of some events giv-
ing rise to the claim (a condition satisfied whenever codefendants reside
in different states or whenever a corporate defendant has multiple resi-
dences), this criterion nonetheless would provide a practical, workable
basis for the jurisdiction. Part IV then deals with other important as-
pects of the proposal, such as scope of coverage, invocation of the juris-
diction, joinder, and choice of law. 6
Discussion of such a new federal jurisdiction must address its rela-
tionship to the already existing forms of federal jurisdiction. Part V
treats the use of a multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction in federal ques-
tion cases and considers the alternative possibilities of continuing or
abolishing the present general diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
Keeping the latter jurisdiction is not incompatible with our proposal;
.peaceful coexistence is possible. The adoption of multiparty, mul-
tiforum jurisdiction, however, would cast a new light on present diver-
sity jurisdiction and on the arguments for its retention, limitation, or
abolition. Arguments against outright abolition of diversity jurisdiction
could well fade if a replacement jurisdiction met modern needs better
than diversity now does.
I. METAMORPHOSES OF THE PROBLEM: A SHORT HISTORY
The problem of scattered, related actions is a multifaceted one,
upon which many types of procedural devices and developments have a
bearing. The most common responses to the problem have been actual
or proposed changes in jurisdiction and joinder. Choice of law, federal
' See infra text accompanying notes 84-85.
'6 To illustrate the form such a statute might take and to set out details not worth
treating in the body of this Article, we include in the Appendix a draft proposal of a
multiparty, multiforum jurisdictional statute with explanatory comments. The language
embodying the core jurisdictional concept mentioned in the text appears in draft 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2). The reader might profit from skimming the Appendix, and par-
ticularly draft § 1367, before proceeding with the rest of this Article.
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venue transfer and consolidation provisions, and former adjudication
principles have also come into play. In this century, perceptions of the
problem and prescriptions for its solution have varied as our procedural
systems and litigation patterns have evolved.
After the adoption of federal statutory interpleader,17 Professor
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. addressed further reform in his essay on the eq-
uitable "bills of peace with multiple parties." ' This device was
designed to deal with situations in which one party faced actions by, or
needed to bring actions against, several persons, with the actions involv-
ing common questions of law or fact. 9 The bill of peace is little known
today, however, because modern devices serve many of its functions in
different ways. Mandatory and permissive party joinder,20 as well as
class actions,' have regularized the departure from a single-plaintiff,
single-defendant model; the availability of such joinder devices in a
merged system of law and equity has largely eliminated the need to
seek in equity the solution to a problem insoluble at law. The abandon-
ment of the requirement of mutuality of estoppel 22 often permits prior
nonparties to benefit from the preclusive effect given to rulings against
prior litigants. This modern approach, in a way that is doubtless not
entirely welcome to the losers, at least reduces the threat of repeated
litigation on the same issue, now generally viewed as an important
goal.
23
Resolving problems in complex litigation, however, can be like
severing heads of the Hydra: at least two more may grow when one is
lopped off. In the 1960's two main responses to such problems were
Congress's adoption in 1968 of section 1407 of the Judicial Code24 and
17 See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
" Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1932).
19 See id. at 1297.
20 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (joinder of persons needed for just adjudication);
20 (permissive joinder of parties); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g)-(h) (cross-claims;
joinder of additional parties to counterclaims and cross-claims); 14 (impleader); 22 (in-
terpleader); 24 (intervention).
21 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
23 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 329 (1971) (noting misallocation of resources when the mutuality principle neces-
sitates retrial of a fully litigated claim); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.14, at 687 (1985) (mutuality requirement "sacrifices judicial
economy and raises the possibility of inconsistent results"); Note, Collateral Estoppel:
The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality, 41 Mo. L. REV. 521, 528 (1976) (stat-
ing as main argument against mutuality rule the need to reduce the number of cases in
the courts).
24 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982) ("When civil actions involving one or more com-
mon questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred
to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. .. ").
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the ALI's never-enacted proposal of a dispersed necessary parties juris-
diction for the federal courts.25 1 Both, however, attempted to deal only
with discrete parts of the scattered-litigation problem. Section 1407
took federal court jurisdiction as it found it and provided only for con-
solidated pretrial proceedings; it made no provision for consolidated
trials without the consent of the parties.26 The ALI proposal focused
solely on necessary parties not joinable in the courts of a single state.27
The proposal was criticized as a cumbersome device responding to a
theoretical problem encountered infrequently, if at all, in reality. 8 To
the extent the problem was genuine,29 moreover, it existed largely be-
cause of limitations on state court service of process;3° the general
25 See ALl STUDY, supra note 9, at 67-76 (proposed 28 U.S.C. §§ 2371-2376).
2 As a practical matter, § 1407 transfers for consolidated pretrial proceedings
often mean that the entire case gets resolved in the transferee court. The gathering in
the transferee forum of all the parties necessary for an agreed resolution may facilitate
pretrial settlement. Moreover, the federal courts may use their authority under §
1404(a) of title 28 to transfer the trial aspects of a complex case if it be "[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," and if the transferee
court is one in which the litigation "might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1982). See generally D. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: HANDLING CASES
BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 9.9 (1986) (discuss-
ing disposition of cases in the transferee court); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
SECOND § 31.122 (1985) [hereinafter MANUAL] (describing power of transferee judge
to transfer cases under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1982)).
The terms of these statutes nonetheless place some limits on their use; further-
more, no existing provision attempts to deal with related litigation split between federal
and state courts. Cf. D. HERR, supra, § 3.6.7, at 34 ("Perhaps the most serious limita-
tion on the [Multidistrict Litigation] Panel's power is its inability to facilitate coordi-
nated or consolidated pretrial proceedings in actions that are pending in both state and
federal courts."). For a discussion of existing possibilities for state-federal judicial coor-
dination, see MANUAL, supra, § 31.31.
27 See ALI STUDY, supra note 9, at 68 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2371(b)) (defining
unjoinable defendant as "necessary" for purposes of jurisdictional provision "if com-
plete relief cannot be accorded the plaintiff in his absence, or if it appears that, under
federal law or relevant State law, an action on the claim would have to be dismissed if
he could not be joined as a party.").
28 See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 1), 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1968). Currie noted, among other things, that the ALI Study gave
"not one example . . . of a case requiring this treatment." Id. We searched among
numerous recent reported cases on necessary party joinder and, consistent with the
thrust of Professor Currie's comment, found none. But see infra note 29.
29 See Diversity JurisdictionIMulti-Party Litigation/Choice of Law in the Fed-
eral Courts: Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 308-09 (1971)
(statement of Prof. Paul J. Mishkin) (citing Haas v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 442 F.2d
394 (5th Cir. 1971), as one example of case in which necessary parties were not join-
able in the courts of a single state). It does appear that the problem of unjoinable,
dispersed necessary parties was, if not nonexistent, at least quite uncommon.
20 Cf Note, ALI Proposals to Expand Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Solution to
Multiparty, Multistate Controversies?, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1109 (1964) (suggesting fed-
eral provision for nationwide state court service of process as an alternative to ALI
proposal).
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spread of state long-arm provisions has at least considerably reduced
that difficulty.3 1 The present lack of a single forum available to join all
necessary parties causes probably no more than a small fraction of the
difficulties engendered by the availability and use of several forums for
related litigation.
More recently, Professor John McCoid has explored possible ap-
proaches to multiparty dispute problems that are left unsolved by our
present joinder devices. 2 He surveys preclusion of nonparties, on a the-
ory of adequate representation; 3 compulsory intervention (enforced by
giving a judgment binding effect on a nonparty with notice who failed
to intervene); s and mandatory joinder that would go beyond current
concepts of necessary parties.35 For situations in which the benefits of
consolidation outweigh the costs, McCoid finds mandatory joinder the
most attractive device.3 6 His discussion, however, focuses primarily on
the procedural aspects of joinder and preclusion, dealing relatively little
with the jurisdictional problems of complex litigation. As his title-A
Single Package for Multiparty Disputes-reflects, his article is primar-
ily about the complications introduced when a dispute is multiparty
rather than when it is multiforum. 87 It is primarily on the multiforum
aspects of the problem that the rest of this Article will focus, arguing
that the need for a federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction has been
heightened by recent case law developments, but that proposals to date
have yet to frame the jurisdiction in the best way to fulfill its potential.
II. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL ACTION-CONSOLIDATING
JURISDICTIO14
The goal of reducing multiple litigation is itself hardly a contro-
versial one and underlies such aspects of our procedural law as mul-
tiparty joinder and former adjudication rules. "In matters of justice,"
wrote Professor Chafee over fifty years ago, "the benefactor is he who
31 But cf. Kamp, The Shrinking Forum: The Supreme Court's Limitation of Ju-
risdiction-An Argument for a Federal Forum in Multi-Party, Multi-State Litiga-
tion, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161, 188 (1979) (increasing Supreme Court limita-
tions on state court jurisdiction contribute to need for ALI-type provision).
32 See McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707
(1976).
33 See id. at 714-18.
4 See id. at 718-24.
31 See id. at 724-28.
36 See id. at 728.
31 Other recent joinder-focused discussions treating problems of mass tort litiga-
tion include Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 779 (1985); Comment, Mandatory Mass Tort Class Actions: Litigating Catastro-
phes Without Creating Litigation Catastrophes, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 91 (1985).
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makes one lawsuit grow where two grew before.""8 Beyond the sheer
economy of not having to litigate the same matters twice, consolidation
of related proceedings can reduce such problems as inconsistent out-
comes,3 9 whipsawing (from the ability of defendants in separate litiga-
tions to point to a nonparty as the one truly liable),' 0 and uncoordi-
nated scrambles for the assets of a limited fund."'
These traditional concerns underlying joinder have taken on new
dimensions and heightened urgency as complex and often dispersed liti-
gation has increased. The sources of such litigation are frequently,
though not exclusively, mass accident and product liability claims."2
The problems they pose are many, such as difficulties in coordination
between state and federal courts,' 3 dangers of bankruptcy of a defend-
ant after several large judgments but before other plaintiffs' claims can
be satisfied,44 and possible unfairness in connection with multiple
" Chafee, supra note 18, at 1297.
39 See, e.g., 129 CONG. REc. H8367 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) (discussing how scattered, related litigation can turn on common issue of
fact yet result in inconsistent determinations on same question); cf. Brunet, A Study in
the Allocation of Scarce judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention
Criteria, 12 GA. L. REv. 701, 713-18 (1978) (potential for increased efficiency and
accuracy in judicial decisionmaking resulting from additional data and perspectives pro-
vided by joinder).
0 See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 906, 458 P.2d
57, 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 123 (1969) (citation omitted) (in case of separate litigation,
"defendant(s) in each case may be able to avoid liability. . . by pointing the finger at
"the absent defendant(s)").
41 See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 18, at 1311-12 (discussing the desirability of join-
der when a fund must be divided or liability is limited); McCoid, supra note 32, at 714
(plaintiffs often choose not to bring joint actions when competing for a limited pot).
Recognition of this danger has led the Supreme Court to approve the use of federal
statutory interpleader as a limited consolidation device when an insurer faces multiple
claims exceeding its policy limits. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386
U.S. 523, 531-33 (1967); infra text accompanying notes 73-75 (discussing limits on use
of federal interpleader).
" See Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REv. 429, 430-33
(1986) (discussing the more than 30,000 suits arising from asbestos-related injuries; the
more than 13,000 suits resulting from use of the Dalkon Shield IUD; the federal class
action concerning Agent Orange, involving from 600,000 to 2.4 million persons; and
other cases involving numerous plaintiffs, which are "usually impossible" to gather in
"a single court or court system"); Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to
a Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 467, 467 (1985) (noting the recent prolifera-
tion of product liability suits, airplane crashes, and explosions resulting in multiforum
litigation).
43 See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1180-83 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (vacating federal class certification because of its
injunctive effect against state court actions); Trangsrud, supra note 37, at 810 (discuss-
ing limits on consolidation when cases arise in both federal and state courts).
"' See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983) ("Because total
claims, if successful, might exceed [defendant's] current assets, . . . the earliest ...
actions tried could exhaust [defendant's] assets and thus . . . plaintiffs who sued later
1986]
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awards of punitive damages.45 In addition, the large number of suits
split between different courts can result in delay and additional expense
for the parties.4
Three widely known, recent examples of complex litigation im-
peded by present limitations are the lawsuits arising out of the collapse
of the skywalks at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel, the claims
against the maker of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, and the
current school asbestos cases. In various ways, all illustrate the difficul-
ties faced by the judicial system today in handling such matters. In the
skywalk cases, the claims were divided between state and federal courts
because of the complete diversity rule. Although the courts did cooper-
ate a good deal in handling the litigation, the federal trial court's effort
to coordinate matters by certifying a class action was frustrated by ap-
pellate reversal. 47 Similarly, in the Dalkon Shield case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed a California district court's limited class certifications
meant to reduce repetitious litigation and avert dangers from multiple
punitive damage awards.48 And in 1986, the Third Circuit also par-
tially reversed class certification by the federal trial court handling the
consolidated litigation in which school districts were seeking damages
under state law from asbestos manufacturers.
49
Whatever the justifications under present law for these reversals of
trial court efforts to reduce scatter and repetition in litigation, the pat-
tern of frustrated attempts raises the question whether it at least should
be possible to consider increased consolidation without some of the pre-
sent restraints. The sense of a growing need to bring large, uncoordi-
nated litigation under better control seems to underlie such recent de-
velopments as the ALI's Preliminary Study of Complex Litigation"0
and the widespread discussion of class action treatment for mass tort
... might not be able to collect on their judgments.").
'1 See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1003-05 (3d Cir.) (dis-
cussing problems resulting from multiple punitive damage awards in successive cases
all stemming from the same wrongful act), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 182 (1986); In re
Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1187-88 (8th Cir.) (discussing concerns with
regard to multiple punitive damage awards), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). See
generally Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323,
327 & n.10, 331-33 (1983).
46 See Rubin, supra note 42, at 434-35.
41 See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1175. Judge Heaney delivered a
lengthy dissent favoring class certification. See id. at 1184-93.
"" See In re Northern Dist. Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d at 847.
'9 See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 996 (order for nationwide
mandatory class for punitive damages reversed; opt-out class for compensatory damages
held properly certified).
1* See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 135:7
MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION
actions.51
Joinder of all related matters and parties should not, of course, be
pursued without concern for the problems that joinder itself can create.
Consolidated litigation can get unwieldy,52 and the ability to file and
pursue a separate action may be a valuable escape hatch if a suppos-
edly coordinated proceeding becomes too intricate. Moreover, consolida-
tion can conflict with important interests in individual control of actions
and fair treatment of individual claims.5" As the examples and discus-
sion in this section indicate, however, the present scattering of related
litigation can yield far more harmful results than consolidation. Mind-
ful of pros and cons on both sides, we are not proposing a legal vacuum
cleaner to suck all parties into a single federal court regardless of the
consequences, but rather a jurisdiction that would permit parties to
seek, and the federal courts to consider, the best ways to handle all
aspects of a complex, multiforum litigation. Depending on the extent to
which issues are common at different stages, the use of separate trials
after joint pretrial, bifurcation of liability and damage trials, and other
such tools of court management 5" should minimize the dangers of
consolidation.
Recent discussion has stressed fairly large cases and the danger of
the defendants or the system consolidating litigation without adequate
regard to the interests of plaintiffs.5" These emphases, however, may
obscure the extent to which consolidation can both serve plaintiffs' in-
terests and prove useful even in smaller cases. The situation underlying
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 56 illustrates these points.
The case was an automobile products liability action that arose out of a
car crash in Oklahoma involving an auto bought in New York. The
injured New York passengers brought suit in Oklahoma state court
51 See, e.g., Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Fed-
eral Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1039 (1986); Williams, supra note 45, at 325-
36; Note, supra note 42, at 473-98.
62 See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 32, at 725 & n.116.
5 See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 37, at 820-24. But see Williams, supra note
45, at 329-30 (attacking individual control argument as specious, self-interested plead-
ing by plaintiffs' bar).
See generally MANUAL, supra note 26 (setting forth principles and procedures
for fair and efficient resolution of complex litigation); Sherman, Restructuring the
Trial Process in the Age of Complex Litigation, 63 TEx. L. REv. 721 (1984) (review-
ing W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION: A
HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1982), and W. BRAZIL, G. HAZARD & P.
RICE, MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPE-
CIAL MASTERS (1983)).
55 See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 37, at 820-24 (discussing the effects of modern
joinder devices on the individual plaintiff's interest in controlling the prosecution of his
claim).
56 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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against the foreign manufacturer, the nationwide importer, the regional
distributor, and the New York retail dealer who had sold them the car.
Although the manufacturer and importer did not press challenges to
territorial jurisdiction, the distributor and dealer did. 7 The Court
agreed that these latter two defendants lacked the contacts with
Oklahoma required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and could not be compelled to defend there. 8 Plaintiffs in such a
case as this, therefore, cannot pursue their claims against all the de-
fendants in the state where the accident occurred and where presum
ably many of the witnesses and much of the evidence would be found.
Furthermore, if the plaintiffs wanted to proceed against a local driver
of the other car as well, no single court in the nation today-federal or
state-could hear all their claims. 9
Commentators have criticized World-Wide Volkswagen for its fail-
ure to take into account the need for a single forum.60 Our concern
here, however, is not with the correctness of the holding but with its
consequences. If the decision requires-as it seems to-that a person
take some action creating enough of an affiliation with a state in order
to be sued in its courts, the states alone cannot resolve the problem of
5 See id. at 288.
58 See id. at 287-99.
5 Federal courts could not join all parties because of the complete diversity rule
and because in state law cases (and many federal question ones) they must normally
borrow state long-arm authority. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a)-(f) (limited scope of federal
process; authority to act pursuant to state law). When a federal court uses a state's
long-arm authority, it borrows not only the authority but also the fourteenth amend-
ment due process limitations on state court territorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., George v.
Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 424-27 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (dismissing
claims arising under federal law against defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction
under long-arm statute of state in which district court sits), cert. granted sub nom.
Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987). These same
due process limits, as defined in World-Wide Volkswagen, bar the state courts from
asserting jurisdiction over all defendants in some cases involving geographically dis-
persed parties.
Even the ALI's proposed dispersed necessary parties jurisdiction would not help in
this sort of case, because defendants who may be jointly or severally liable are normally
regarded as merely proper parties for permissive joinder, not as necessary or indispen-
sable ones whose joinder is to be required if feasible. See ALI STUDY, supra note 9, at
68 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2371(b), in part: "Persons against whom several liability is
asserted shall not be deemed necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim
because liability is asserted against them jointly or alternatively as well."). Compare
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (stressing, among other things, danger of inconsistent obligations
and not merely inconsistent determinations as requisite for mandatory joinder) with
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (providing for permissive joinder when related rights to relief are
asserted against defendants jointly, severally, or in alternative).
80 See Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 533, 537-39 (1982); Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's
New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 GA. L. REV. 19, 45-47, 53 (1980).
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scattered litigation resulting from multiparty, multiforum disputes.61
And with World-Wide Volkswagen making it constitutionally impossi-
ble for state court systems to solve the problem, several nonconstitu-
tional limitations render present federal jurisdiction and joinder inade-
quate to the task as well: The current structure of diversity jurisdiction
actually splits some multiparty cases that could constitutionally come
within federal jurisdiction;62 class actions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 and federal statutory interpleader can go only part way,
even when federal jurisdiction presents no obstacles.63
The shortcomings of the present diversity jurisdiction are familiar
to those initiated in its intricacies, although the burden that the com-
plete diversity requirement places on complex cases is too often over-
looked.6 4 A plaintiff with related state law claims against a state co-
citizen and an out-of-stater can sue them together only in state court
(assuming, as will not always be the case after World-Wide Volks-
wagen, that one state court system can exercise jurisdiction over both
defendants). A plaintiff determined to sue the out-of-stater in the fed-
eral forum, therefore, must either bring two actions or forgo the claim
against the cocitizen. 5 If citizens of different states, one of common
61 See Kamp, supra note 60, at 45-46. World-Wide Volkswagen, is, to be sure,
only part of the problem-albeit a key part, because it makes clear that federal court
jurisdiction must be at least a major element of any comprehensive effort at dealing
with scattered litigation. Such litigation can arise either because of the inability of
plaintiffs to join all proper defendants in one forum or because one or more defend-
ants-even if suable in one jurisdiction-find themselves haled into court in different
places by different plaintiffs. World-Wide Volkswagen relates only to the first of these
two types of situations. Our courts' present inability to deal with the latter type flows
from several aspects of existing federal jurisdictional statutes and procedural rules.
Professor Elinor Schroeder makes the valuable suggestion of an interstate agree-
ment on transfer and consolidation for pretrial proceedings when related litigation is
pending in courts of different states, something of a counterpart to the federal Judicial
Code's § 1407. See Schroeder, Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failure of Non-
party Preclusion and an Alternative Proposal, 67 IOWA L. REV. 917, 965 (1982).
The article acknowledges, however, that the constitutional limits on state court jurisdic-
tion imposed by World-Wide Volkswagen might require that transfers go only to states
with which defendants have adequate contacts. See id. at 972-73.
62 See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
64 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (interpreting prede-
cessor of present general diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), to
require that for federal diversity jurisdiction, all plaintiffs be of different state citizen-
ship from all defendants).
65 See, e.g., Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: The Silver Lining, 66
A.B.A. J. 177, 178, 180 (1980). See generally Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in
the Federal Courts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608, 634 (1954) (com-
plete diversity rule contributes to exclusion from federal courts of the very cases-those
involving scattered defendants-that they are better equipped than state courts to
handle).
The amount in controversy requirement in the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28
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citizenship with a defendant and the other of diverse citizenship, are
both potential state-law claimants and the diverse plaintiff exercises the
right to choose the federal forum, then the litigation will inevitably be
split, with the plaintiff who is a cocitizen of the defendant confined to
state court.
66
In sum, the present diversity jurisdiction responds rather per-
versely to the problem of scattered litigation. Because of the complete
diversity rule, it ensures the federal forum when the danger of disper-
sion is least-in single-plaintiff, single-defendant cases when the parties
are from different states. The greater the danger of scattered litigation,
i.e., when more parties from more states or nations thicken the plot, the
greater the chance that the litigation will be irremediably split between
state and federal courts.67 Moreover, present diversity rules even create
the possibility of maneuvers to secure federal jurisdiction (such as suing
only a diverse defendant in federal court) or to prevent it (such as join-
ing diverse and nondiverse defendants, or diverse home-state defend-
ants, in state court), on grounds that have nothing to do with the need
for a federal forum. 8
As for class actions, limits on both joinder and federal jurisdiction
render the federal class action device less than fully adequate to provide
a single forum, even in cases with plaintiffs numerous enough to qual-
ify for class action treatment. The 1966 Advisory Committee members
revising Federal Rule 23 made plain their view that the rule was not to
be used regularly in mass accident situations: such cases are "ordinarily
not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that signifi-
cant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of lia-
bility, [will] be present, affecting the individuals in different ways."6 9
U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), also excludes from federal court those who cannot in good faith
assert state law claims exceeding $10,000, whatever the citizenship of those against
whom they claim. Cf Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,
288 (1938) (for purposes of amount in controversy requirement necessary to invoke
diversity jurisdiction, the sum claimed in good faith in the plaintiff's complaint
controls).
66 Cf Note, Air Crash Litigation and 28 U.S.C. Section 1407: Experience Sug-
gests a Solution, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 927, 945 (state court actions are beyond reach
of federal pretrial consolidation under § 1407 if removal from state to federal court is
impossible, as for want of diversity jurisdiction).
87 See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (actions following collapse of skywalks in hotel were split
between state and federal courts; actions in federal court were consolidated, as were the
state court actions, but intersystem consolidation proved impossible).
68 See infra note 109.
69 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes (1966). See generally 3B J.
MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE T 23.02[2.-18] (2d ed. 1985)
(discussing the availability of Rule 23 in personal injury actions). The pressures of
finding ways to deal with mass disaster litigation since the revision of Rule 23 in 1966
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With regard to jurisdiction, although incomplete diversity problems can
be circumvented by choosing named class representatives of diverse citi-
zenship from the defendants,7 0 the holding in Zahn v. International
Paper Co.,71 which limits class membership to those who individually
satisfy an applicable jurisdictional amount requirement, has sharply re-
stricted class actions within the diversity jurisdiction. 2
have, despite the revisers' position, led both to some judicial use of the class action
device in such situations and to a good deal of commentary urging its appropriateness.
See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 26, § 33.24, at 298 ("Courts have only recently begun
to consider the propriety of forming a class under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) in the mass
tort context on the theory that a single award of punitive damages is appropriate or
that the claims greatly exceed the funds available."); 7B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1783, at 73 (2d ed. 1986) (despite the
Advisory Committee's comment, "In many ways Rule 23(b)(3) seems particularly ap-
propriate for some [mass] tort cases . . . ."); Gordon, The Optimum Management of
the Skywalks Mass Disaster Litigation by Use of the Federal Mandatory Class Action
Device, 52 UMKC L. REV. 215, 215-17 & nn.1-4 (1984) (class action device can en-
sure fairness and efficiency in mass disaster situations); Williams, supra note 45; Com-
ment, supra note 37.
The Advisory Committee's position, however, continues to persuade many courts
that mass torts should not receive class action treatment. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra, § 1783, at 73 & n.7. Those courts that do certify classes
in such cases often do so with provision for class members to opt out. See, e.g., In re
School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 182 (1986).
Although authorized and in some instances required under present class action rules,
this measure reintroduces the dangers of dispersed litigation and inconsistent outcomes.
10 See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1921); C.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 484 (4th ed. 1983).
71 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
71 See, e.g., Becker, The Class Action Conflict: A 1976 Report, 75 F.R.D. 167,
168 (1977).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S.
Ct. 2965 (1985), makes only a limited improvement in the courts' ability to deal with
potentially scattered litigation. Shutts allowed state courts to exercise territorial juris-
diction over absent plaintiff class members who had no contacts with the forum state,
provided that they were adequately represented, sent notice, and given an opportunity
to appear or opt out. See id. at 2972-77. The holding does not appear to help when a
case is unsuitable for class action treatment and, in particular, is unlikely to apply in
the common mass tort situation involving several, but not a great many, scattered
defendants.
In addition, the conflicts holding in Shutts, which limits the authority of a court
hearing a multistate class action to apply forum law-may reduce the commonality of
issues and the manageability that can influence a court's decision whether to certify a
class action. See Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class
Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 68-69 (1986); Com-
ment, Choice of Law and the Multistate Class: Forum Interests in Matters Distant,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 915 (1986).
The importance to complex litigation problems of limits on the use of class actions
suggests the possibility of overcoming such difficulties not by a new federal court juris-
diction but rather by changing the statutes and rules governing class treatment. Such
measures may be well worth exploring, see, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 51, but they
cannot provide a comprehensive response. Many cases that are quite substantial but do
not involve large numbers of parties are unlikely to be appropriate class actions. More-
over, a jurisdictional provision facilitating both class and nonclass handling would avoid
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Finally, federal statutory interpleader is a device largely confined
to the exigencies of the stakeholder situation, involving the threat of
multiple and inconsistent liability, for which it was framed. In the lead-
ing case, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, the Supreme
Court disallowed the use of a single, limited insurance fund as the basis
for consolidating all actions arising out of a multidefendant accident,
stating that "federal interpleader was not intended to serve the function
of a 'bill of peace' in the context of multiparty litigation arising out of a
mass tort . . ."7 The majority opinion acknowledged that its "view of
interpleader means that it cannot be used to solve all the vexing
problems of multiparty litigation arising out of a mass tort." 5
Tashire thus established that statutory interpleader in its present
form often cannot do the job of consolidating multiparty, multiforum
litigation. At the same time, however, it confirmed the existence of fed-
eral constitutional authority to provide for a federal court jurisdiction
that would do so, for in the very same case the Court ruled that the
complete diversity requirement is one of statutory construction only and
not a constitutional limitation binding Congress." Read together with
World-Wide Volkswagen, Tashire underscores the great difference in
the constitutional ability of the states and of the federal judicial system
to deal with scattered litigation. World-Wide Volkswagen made it clear
that constitutional limits on state courts' territorial jurisdiction keep the
states from responding fully to the jurisdictional need; Tashire settles
that the federal government can constitutionally meet the need. Al-
though the federal courts presently lack subject matter jurisdiction and
accompanying process authority to deal with the problem, no constitu-
tional barriers appear to stand in the way of their exercising adequate
federal subject matter 7 and territorial" jurisdiction.
skewing case-by-case choices toward the class form, with its dangers of greater submer-
sion of individual interests.
73 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
74 Id. at 537.
75 Id. at 535.
Interpleader under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 is even less useful than
statutory interpleader as a general action-consolidating device, because Rule 22 is avail-
able only for cases otherwise within federal jurisdiction; as a practical matter, such
actions are nearly always diversity cases. Rule interpleader is thus subject to the limita-
tions imposed by the present requirements for the general diversity jurisdiction. Com-
plete diversity is required-that is, the stakeholder cannot be of the same state citizen-
ship as any of the claimants. Statutory interpleader requires only minimal diversity:
any pair of claimants with different citizenships will satisfy the diversity test. See 28
U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1982).
718 See Tashire, 386 U.S. at 530-31; accord Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kro-
ger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 n.13 (1978).
77 See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
78 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 70, § 64, at 421 (discussing existing congressional
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III. DEFINING A FEDERAL MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM
JURISDICTION
In framing a federal jurisdictional statute to deal with scattered
litigation, it is necessary to consider in detail the circumstances in
which federal jurisdiction is the appropriate response. The concern is
not with difficulty of issues, amounts at stake, or number of parties
involved as such;79 these sorts of "mere" complexity do not justify fed-
eral intrusion on what would otherwise be the states' domain. Rather,
the initial focus belongs on situations in which the multistate nature of
the federal union prevents the states from responding adequately to the
problem of scattered litigation, be it simple or complex.,0
authority to provide for nationwide and international service of process); Wechsler,
Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 216, 239-40 (1948) (arguing that constitutional authority for citizenship-based
federal jurisdiction is properly usable when "there is need for process that outruns state
borders").
The view of a majority of courts and commentators appears to be that in other
than ordinary diversity cases, the required minimum contacts for territorial jurisdiction
of a federal court are those with the United States and not with the court's district or
the state in which the court sits. See, e.g., Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co., 743
F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1984) (In admiralty, "[flederal jurisdiction being national in
scope, due process requires sufficient contacts within the United States as a whole.");
von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated,
63 B.U.L. REV. 279, 332 (1983) (federal jurisdiction in statutory interpleader actions);
cf. Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1982) (if only one nationwide federal trial court
existed, issues as to its territorial jurisdiction would virtually never arise); Schroeder,
supra note 61, at 966 (constitutionality of federal interdistrict transfers under § 1407
has never been seriously challenged because courts are those of same sovereign).
Some writers, however, have argued strongly for more restrictive tests for the con-
stitutionality of federal court territorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fullerton, supra note 4,
at 6 (suggesting due process limits on federal court territorial jurisdiction determined by
weighing of factors of inconvenience to defendant, defendant's ability to anticipate liti-
gation in forum, and federal interests in exercising jurisdiction where asserted); Ste-
phens, The Federal Court Across the Street: Constitutional Limits on Federal Court
Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 697, 719-22 (1984) (advo-
cating a multifactor reasonableness approach under the fifth amendment due process
clause); cf. Abraham, Constitutional Limitations upon the Territorial Reach of Fed-
eral Process, 8 VILL, L. REV. 520, 535 (1963) (for fifth amendment due process rea-
sons, federal venue might need to be confined by some requirement of fairness and
relatedness of forum to action).
The justifications for a federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction should in great
measure satisfy even the more restrictive standards for assertion of territorial jurisdic-
tion over scattered parties. If necessary, either statutory venue standards or case-by-case
regard for the convenience of parties should suffice to deal with any remaining
questions.
7, This list of characteristics of complex litigation is taken from R. MARCUS & E.
SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL
PROCEDURE 6-7 (1985).
80 See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 9, at 378 (referring to problems that "do not
relate simply to trial efficiency at large, but grow out of the multi-state nature of our
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A threshold decision must be whether a new jurisdiction should
attempt to deal only with dispersed necessary parties not joinable in the
courts of a single state or to allow broader joinder. If we chose to deal
only with necessary parties, we could quickly conclude this Article by
endorsing the ALI's proposal designed for that situation or by tinkering
with the ALI draft to improve it. We favor, however, a broader mul-
tiparty, multiforum jurisdiction embracing permissive joinder in cases
involving actual, or seriously threatened, scattered but related litigation
of significant scale. We do so for several reasons, not the least of which
is the sense that the problem addressed by the ALI draft arises fairly
infrequently. By contrast, troublesome dispersed litigation of sorts with
which the ALI provisions did not attempt to deal is quite common,
especially because even when a single forum is available, plaintiffs in
multiparty cases will often sue elsewhere.8" When such scattered litiga-
tion occurs, a federal action-consolidating jurisdiction could achieve the
economies sought by the permissive joinder rules, reduce the danger of
inconsistent outcomes, and counteract the case-splitting effects of the
complete diversity rule.
In view of all the problems that the Strawbridge rule causes, an
initial thought could be simply to abolish the complete diversity re-
quirement.82 Although that measure would yield an easily adminis-
trable system, its adoption seems politically unlikely because of the con-
siderable number of cases it would add to the already heavy federal
court caseload. Much of that likely increase in volume, moreover,
would consist of cases that present no scatter problem and have no need
for a federal forum on that ground.8"
In this sense, minimal diversity would do too much; from another
perspective, it would do too little to meet the problem of scattered liti-
Union and hence present a special basis for federal intervention"); Wechsler, supra
note 78, at 239-40 (recognizing, inter alia, situations "where there is need for process
that outruns state borders," such as federal statutory interpleader, as appropriate for
grant of federal forum, because federal intervention is then premised "on a current
finding of a state inadequacy. The problem is to limit intervention to the situations
where it is in fact responsive to such need.").
81 See infra note 109.
82 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). For a vigorous argument
in favor of legislative overruling of Strawbridge, based largely on the volume of purely
procedural litigation it engenders, see Currie, supra note 28, at 18-45.
82 Such cases would include multistate plaintiff cases against a single defendant
based on events in the defendant's home state, or single-plaintiff lawsuits involving
scattered defendants all of whom have constitutionally sufficient contacts with a single
state. Minimal diversity would also, of course, retain the present federal jurisdiction
over single-plaintiff, single-defendant lawsuits in which diversity is present and the
jurisdictional amount requirement is satisfied. Such cases virtually never raise any
threat of scattered litigation.
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gation. Under a minimal diversity rule, it would still be possible for a
defendant to be sued on the same event in federal court by diverse
plaintiffs and in state court by nondiverse (or diverse) plaintiffs. If we
wanted to deal with this situation by consolidation in federal court,
some removal provision would be needed. Such a provision would have
to include a definition of situations in which multiforum litigation is a
significant enough concern to justify the availability and use of the fed-
eral forum. Yet just such a definition would also be needed in any pro-
vision for original multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction in those cases,
and only those cases, in which scattered litigation was a genuine pros-
pect. Consolidation by removal under a broad minimal diversity regime
thus offers no advantages over consolidation by a more precisely focused
original jurisdiction scheme.
The 1979 Justice Department proposal, although a worthy early
effort in a difficult and previously little-explored area, did not focus
adequately on the situations in which scattered-litigation problems
would and would not arise. An effect of the proposal's somewhat com-
plicated provisions was to require that victims-either prospective or
actual plaintiffs-be citizens of at least two different states.84 Although
the scattered-victims requisite is satisfied in most mass disasters (the
main concern of the Justice Department proposal), the requirement
produces some undesirable exclusions and inclusions. If, for example, a
mixed-citizenship tour group is involved in a single-bus crash in the
home state of all defendants (driver, company, etc.), the home state's
courts are a logical forum,"5 and yet the scattered-victims focus could
84 In addition to requiring threshold numbers of victims, types of claims, and
amounts involved, the proposal provided for jurisdiction if the action was "between a
plaintiff who is a citizen of a state and any defendants, as long as any defendant and
any person injured in the event, transaction, occurrence, or course of conduct is a citi-
zen of a state different from that of any plaintiff. . . ." 1979 House Hearings, supra
note 12, at 159. (The 1983 and 1986 Kastenmeier bills have used language that is
identical or has the same effect. See H.R. 4315, supra note 10, § 3 ("citizen of a State
and a defendant"); H.R. 3690, supra note 10, § 4(a)(1) (language identical to that
found in the Justice Department proposal).) The phrasing appears to include injuries
inflicted on a multistate group by a single defendant acting solely in his home state,
because a plaintiff diverse from the defendant would also be a citizen of a state different
from that of some other victim. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 160
(section-by-section analysis).
85 Local bias against out-of-staters could very well be a reason why the defend-
ants' home state courts might not be the only logical forum. We cannot resolve here all
the empirical issues that might support abolition, curtailment, or retention of the pres-
ent general diversity jurisdiction. See generally Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity
Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Implications for Reform, 15 LAW & Soc'y REv. 749
(1981) (reporting most common factors influencing choice of federal and state forums);
Goldman & Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical
Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1980) (finding that attorneys' perceptions of local
prejudice enter into the calculation of forum choice). Existing diversity jurisdiction in
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admit such a dispute to federal court. But if a single-citizenship group
is involved in an accident with defendants from several states, as might
well be the case with a local club's air tour, the failure to satisfy the
scattered-victims requirement would exclude the case from federal court
despite the possibility of multiforum litigation.
We propose a different approach to avoid these problems and to
provide the basis for a jurisdiction focused precisely on those cases in
which multiforum litigation is a genuine possibility. The main factor
that appears to isolate and define this situation is whether any defend-
ant has a residence8" in a state other than the one in which a substan-
tial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the action occurred.87
This situation will always exist if defendants have different resi-
dences,88 as it will if a defendant has a certain residence and at least
part of the acts or omissions occurred elsewhere.89 Federal jurisdiction
fact responds to the problem of local prejudice imperfectly and at times perversely, for
it lets an in-state plaintiff sue in federal court. It even permits structuring a lawsuit to
try to take advantage of any home-state bias by joinder of nondiverse parties or home-
state defendants in state court so as to prevent removal.
86 The use of residence, rather than citizenship, is deliberate. Defendants can al-
ways be sued where they live, whatever their citizenship. For individual American citi-
zens, residence and state citizenship will usually coincide. But a resident alien could be
a citizen of no American state and still be sued in two states on the same event if he
resided in one and the events occurred in another. And a corporation, which is deemed
for federal venue purposes to be a resident of "any judicial district in which it is incor-
porated or licensed to do business or is doing business," 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982),
might be sued in various jurisdictions on claims arising out of the same events, even if it
were a citizen of only one state.
87 For language designed to cast this concept in statutory form, see draft §
1367(a)(1)-(2) in the Appendix. Litigation scattered among American courts could also
arise even without a defendant residing in one state and events occurring in another if,
for example, a nonresident alien was the only defendant and substantial parts of the
events in question took place in two or more American states. The draft statute at-
tempts to provide for such situations as well.
88 Cf Barrett, supra note 65, at 634 ("[T]hought should be given to a jurisdic-
tional statute which would give the federal courts jurisdiction of nonfederal question
cases in all those situations and only those situations where there are several defendants
and the defendants reside in different states, even though one or more of the defendants
may reside in the same state as the plaintiff."); Kessler, Corporations and the New
Federal Diversity Statute: A Denial of Justice, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 239, 248 (scat-
tered-defendants situations "would certainly be a desirable area for the intervention of
federal jurisdiction. Unfortunately, Congress has declined to make it available in all but
a few specialized types of cases.").
89 In this latter situation, all plaintiffs and all defendants could be of the same
citizenship, thus leaving the constitutional requirement of minimal diversity unsatisfied.
For example, a team might charter a local bus with a local driver, head for a game in
another state, and run off the road in a single-vehicle accident in the other state. Al-
though the plaintiffs might sue in the courts of both states, any multiplicity would be
beyond the reach of a diversity-based federal jurisdiction. Consequently, a federal juris-
dictional statute should include a minimal diversity requirement in addition to the req-
uisites discussed in the text. Such no-diversity situations still involving possible scat-
tered litigation suggest that state law provisions for transfer from the courts of one state
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need not, of course, always be provided whenever these conditions exist;
if plaintiffs choose to bring all their claims in the courts of one state, for
example, removal to federal court would be unnecessary.9" It also is not
worth expending the resources of the federal forum on quite small
cases, even when scattered litigation is possible or actually occurring.
Such contingencies can be treated by the implementing provisions of a
federal action-consolidating jurisdiction, such as a requirement of a
minimum amount in controversy per victim or perhaps, for cases in-
volving small numbers of victims, a requirement of proof of unavaila-
bility of a single state forum and a right of removal defined more nar-
rowly than the original jurisdiction.91
It would, of course, be somewhat unorthodox to include in a grant
of federal subject matter jurisdiction a focus on the location of events.
We are more accustomed to definitions based on federal questions or
parties' citizenships. Yet it is only by virtue of law school indoctrination
and venerable custom that we are used to regarding citizenship as re-
lated to subject matter jurisdiction. It would be little or no stranger to
take the locus of events into account.92 The function of this element of
the definition is to limit a jurisdiction based on minimal diversity to the
purpose for which it is established: dealing with problems of scattered
litigation. In parallel fashion, the existing grant of statutory inter-
pleader jurisdiction includes reference to the joinder device of inter-
pleader; 93 and the ALI's definition of its dispersed necessary parties
jurisdiction included determinations of indispensability of the scattered
defendants and their amenability to process in one jurisdiction.94 As
these examples illustrate, innovative definitional features may be neces-
to those of another could be a useful adjunct to a federal jurisdiction. See generally
Schroeder, supra note 61, at 963-66 (proposing interstate agreement regarding consoli-
dation of scattered litigation cases).
90 Another unnecessary, and possibly even harmful, inclusion in a jurisdictional
definition would be the scattered-victims provision of the original Justice Department
proposal. Such a feature makes sense only if general diversity jurisdiction and the com-
plete diversity rule survive. If they do, a state law case with entirely in-state defendants,
but both in-state and out-of-state plaintiffs, is likely to be split between state and fed-
eral courts. Without the present diversity jurisdiction, scattered litigation would usually
occur only when there were defendants of different residences, or when a defendant
resided somewhere else than where some of the events in the suit occurred.
91 See infra text accompanying notes 96-115.
92 Determining where events took place for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction
should be relatively easy, especially because the definition could be phrased so as not to
call for a finding of a single locus for the transactions in question. Present determina-
tions on citizenship for diversity jurisdiction purposes and on the district "in which the
claim arose," 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1982), for venue rulings can be far more complex
than findings on where a substantial part of the events at issue occurred.
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
94 See ALI STUDY, supra note 9, at 67-68.
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sary to serve the purposes of a multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction.
The focus on dispersion of events and defendants should be the
core of the definition of a federal action-consolidating jurisdiction, for
such a definition includes only those cases in which scattered litigation
is possible. That does not, however, complete the task of framing such a
jurisdiction; refinement and supplementation by other features such as
process, removal, transfer, and choice of law are also necessary. Again,
it may not be desirable to provide the federal forum for the smallest
cases meeting the bare requisite of dispersion of events and defendants.
Therefore, we turn next to a discussion of the several principal features
beyond the core jurisdictional definition itself that must be considered
in framing such a new jurisdiction.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE JURISDICTION
If Congress resolved to establish a federal multiparty, multiforum
jurisdiction, it would face many subsidiary decisions about its charac-
teristics.95 At least some of these decisions, such as jurisdictional
amount requirements, would properly be political, informed by such
considerations as estimated impact on federal caseloads and concern for
intrusion on the domain of the state courts. We do not attempt here to
resolve these matters. We seek instead to identify the major decisions
that would have to be made and the factors influencing them, and also
to suggest which choices are appropriately left to political judgment and
which ones seem better governed by more strictly technical concerns. In
short, we are not trying to advance a rigid and unchangeable proposal.
Rather, after arguing for a new jurisdiction, we have suggested that
certain core problems should be approached in particular ways. Beyond
that, we believe that the jurisdiction's incidental features do not pose
insuperable problems and can be handled by various approaches.
A. Coverage
The 1979 Justice Department proposal would have limited the
" Although it would be tempting to draft the simplest possible jurisdictional stat-
ute and leave vexing details to be worked out in judicial practice, such an approach
could encounter difficulties because various well-established subsidiary aspects of our
present system were evolved without regard for the consolidation of scattered, related
litigation. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 105-08 (requirement that all mem-
bers of plaintiff class must individually have claims as large as jurisdictional amount);
infra text accompanying notes 122-38 (unsuitability of present choice-of-law principles
governing state law cases in federal court). Thus, rather than leave all the details for
judicial development, the jurisdictional legislation itself should not only establish a gen-
eral framework, but also address at least some of the foreseeable complications.
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availability of the new federal jurisdiction to situations involving "per-
sonal injury or injury to the property of twenty-five or more persons"
in which "the sum or value of the injury to any twenty-five persons
exceeds $10,000 per person, exclusive of interests [sic] and costs." '96 The
focus of the proposal was thus on substantial mass torts, such as airline
crashes and drug liability cases. The limits imposed were of three
kinds: subject matter, number of persons injured, and dollar value of
injuries. Technically, the definition of the jurisdiction could eliminate
all such restrictions and still be workable, although without some limits
it might bring too many cases into federal court. 97 Even expanded to its
broadest limits, however, the jurisdiction would remain constitutional,
as long as it required minimal diversity.98
Various requirements narrowing the jurisdiction may be justified
or politically necessary; but if the problems of scattered litigation are
important enough to warrant creating a new federal jurisdiction, any
limits imposed on such a jurisdiction should interfere as little as possi-
ble with its basic action-consolidating purpose and should themselves
serve significant ends. Among the factors that should influence decisions
on whether and how to limit the jurisdiction are: caseload, intrusion
into state courts' domains, administrability, and the danger of leaving
no single forum provided for scattered litigation outside the limits of-the
new jurisdiction.
One concern with subject matter limits like those in the Justice
Department and Kastenmeier proposals is that they create the threat of
threshold disputes on preliminary procedural issues, quite apart from
" 1979 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 158. Representative Kastenmeier's
1983 and 1986 bills have essentially the same coverage requirements but include lan-
guage requiring that the sum or value of injury be "alleged in good faith." See H.R.
4315, supra note 10, § 3; H.R. 3690, supra note 10, § 4.
11 We have not been able to think of a way to make any meaningful estimate of
the likely caseload under a new federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction; in part, of
course, the caseload would depend on the jurisdiction's definitional terms, which could
be broad or narrow. Congress might wish to start experimentally with a definition
including only fairly large cases to get an idea of the burdens on the federal judiciary
before considering whether to broaden coverage. It might even be wise to make the
jurisdiction explicitly discretionary, lest the economy goals be frustrated in massive con-
solidated cases. See infra text accompanying note 111. In any event, it seems unlikely
that the workload generated by a new jurisdictional provision could be significantly
greater than that imposed by the existing diversity jurisdiction, which makes the federal
forum available on a basis unrelated to need, even when other related cases are pending
in state courts open to the diversity plaintiff.
98 See ALI STUDY, supra note 9, at 426-36. "Congress apparently may found
jurisdiction on less than total diversity of citizenship among all adverse parties, and
may authorize process of a federal court to run throughout the country, without regard
to the respondent's earlier relationship with the particular district to which he is sum-
moned." Id. at 378.
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the merits. Would property damage, if that were one type of claim
within the jurisdiction, include loss to intangibles? Such an issue might
be among the simpler ones in borderline cases as counsel vied to be in
or out of federal court. The difficulties that have arisen in defining the
domestic relations exception to general diversity jurisdiction,9" for ex-
ample, suggest the wisdom of keeping subject matter limits to a mini-
mum. Nonetheless, if the problem of scattered litigation is regarded as
particularly acute in a single field, or if Congress wants to experiment
with a limited version of the jurisdiction with an eye to possible expan-
sion later, subject matter limits could be justifiable.
Limits based on scale-number of actual or potential parties and
amounts at stake-should pose fewer threshold litigation problems, but
they present difficulties of their own. Some scale minimums seem es-
sential to keep out trivial cases; if federal statutory interpleader, re-
sponding to the acute problem of conflicting liabilities, can exclude
cases involving a stake below $500,100 a dispersed-parties jurisdiction
responding to the difficulties of scattered litigation need not be all-in-
clusive. 101 For example, some limit based on the number of persons
involved seems entirely reasonable. A definition permitting the jurisdic-
tion to be readily invoked when there are very few parties might tempt
plaintiffs' counsel to go defendant-shopping in order to have a forum
choice.
Yet the problems of scattered litigation can be present even in
smaller cases. Confining federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction to
big cases would leave smaller ones exposed to the dangers that the ju-
risdiction is meant to address, dangers that can often be avoided today
only if a federal forum is available.10 2 Indeed, smaller cases are in one
sense particularly attractive, because in handling them the federal
courts could provide the useful action-consolidating service they are
uniquely suited to render, but without always having to deal with cases
of great complexity. The best solution to such dilemmas may be to de-
fine the jurisdiction so as not to confine it exclusively to very large
cases, but to include safeguards allowing it to be invoked in medium-
, See, e.g., Note, Application of the Federal Abstention Doctrines to the Domestic
Relations Exception to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1096-
1100 (For over 100 years, courts have attempted to define limits for the domestic rela-
tions exemption, recognizing that the boundaries of the exception are uncertain.).
100 See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1982).
101 For cases falling below federal scale thresholds, it would be particularly useful
if states created a system for interstate transfer in scattered-litigation situations. See
generally Schroeder, supra note 61 (proposing an interstate agreement on handling
such cases).
101 See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
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sized cases only when scattered litigation is unavoidable or is actually
occurring.103
In addition to number-of-parties requirements, some amounts-at-
stake threshold is warranted to save the federal courts from having to
deal with trivial state law cases.1°4 Whatever the amount requirements
set, however, for this new jurisdiction Congress should discard the rule
of Zahn v. International Paper Co.'0 5 Zahn mandates that in diversity
class actions, all plaintiff class members in a case in which aggregation
is not possible must satisfy the jurisdictional requirement individually
to be included in the class in the federal action.0 6 Under Zahn, even
though some plaintiffs whose own claims satisfy the amount in contro-
versy requirement seek to represent the class and properly bring their
part of the dispute in federal court, others who do not satisfy the re-
quirement may not join the action.10 7 Whatever its justifiability for di-
versity class actions, the Zahn rule would subvert the purposes of a
multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction: it denies a single federal forum in
cases in which one would be useful, and, in fact, often forces the split-
ting of actions between state and federal courts.
Indeed, not only should the Zahn rule be inapplicable to the new
jurisdiction, but also it should be possible even for those with claims
below the jurisdictional minimum to initiate actions in federal court.
The function of scale requirements would be to ensure that only dis-
putes of a certain magnitude came to federal court. If those having or
defending against smaller claims are part of the dispute and allowed to
participate in the federal litigation, it should not matter which dispu-
tant with a real stake files or removes to invoke the jurisdiction.'08 The
contrary rule would cause undue procedural shuffles, forcing those with
smaller claims either to wait for the initiation of a federal action or, as
might be necessary because of statutes of limitations, to file in state
court and then seek consolidation when someone bringing or defending
a larger claim finally filed in or removed to federal court.
103 See infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
204 By abolishing the amount -in controversy requirement for the general federal
question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), however, Congress has reflected the
widely shared sense that the federal courts should be open even for small federal law
cases. For discussion of how the new jurisdiction could mesh with existing federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, see infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
105 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
10' See id. at 294-301.
107 See id. at 301 ("Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the
jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the
case-'one plaintiff may not ride in on another's coattails.' ") (quoting Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973)).
108 See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 160 (section-by-section analysis
of Justice Department proposal).
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B. Invoking the Jurisdiction: Initiation, Removal-and Judicial
Discretion?
Normally, one who has a claim within federal jurisdiction may get
into federal court simply by filing a complaint with appropriate allega-
tions. With a multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction for scattered litigation
problems, however, such a straightforward approach may not be the
most desirable. It is one thing for the possibility of scattered litigation
to exist; it is another matter for the threat to be significant or to actu-
ally ripen. If a plaintiff or plaintiffs have a choice between suing in
multiple forums and suing in one, some of the same reasons that make
a new jurisdiction desirable as a matter of policy-particularly econ-
omy from consolidation of related proceedings-will act as incentives to
the parties and may induce them to bring all claims in a single court
anyway. When that happens, no need to use a federal action-consoli-
dating jurisdiction arises.
Yet if the federal jurisdiction were available, parties would often
invoke it, just as now they often elect federal over state court in diver-
sity actions.' 09 To avoid burdening the federal courts with cases that
are too minor or pose only slight dangers- of serious scattering, some
screening mechanisms almost certainly would be needed. One approach
would be an explicit grant of some degree of discretion for federal
courts to take or decline cases meeting the minimum requirements for
the jurisdiction; another, to be used by itself or in combination with
discretion, would be to employ some of the types of threshold criteria
discussed in the preceding section.
Judicial discretion and the exercise of abstention are not usually
regarded as consonant with the virtual mandate of the exercise of prop-
erly invoked federal court subject matter jurisdiction."0 Nevertheless,
discretion might make sense for a new jurisdiction and would be
unarguably legitimate if authorized by Congress."' If conferred in con-
109 See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 260-64 (trial lawyers choose
federal courts over state courts for a variety of reasons including preferences for federal
judges, juries, and procedures; the federal court calendar; and geographical conven-
ience); ALI STUDY, supra note 9, at 383 (parties often desire a federal forum for
reasons that do not relate to the grounds for its establishment).
110 See, e.g., Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984). But see generally Shapiro, Jurisdiction
and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985) (The exercise of judicial discretion
concerning jurisdiction has ancient common law roots in Anglo-American legal tradi-
tion; its use can help ease interbranch and intergovernmental tensions in the complex
American governmental system.).
"I" Cf United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966) (pendent
jurisdiction power exists when "the entire action before the court comprises but one
constitutional 'case,'" but "pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion"); ALI
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nection with invocations of the jurisdiction, such judicial discretion
should probably reside in a single multijudge panel to ensure some reg-
ularity in its exercise, rather than in individual judges who might un-
derstandably want to decline authority over highly complex cases. Even
if conferred on a panel, however, discretion to decline cases within the
jurisdiction could be questionable because the decision would often call
for an impossible degree of foresight about whether significant numbers
of related cases were likely to be filed or not. Misjudgments on such
questions could lead to wasted state court litigation and return trips to
the panel. Discretion, then, might better be reserved for such post-juris-
dictional decisions as consolidation and transfer, stays when a maverick
party invokes federal jurisdiction though all others prefer state court,
retention beyond pretrial stages, bifurcation, and remand for damage
determinations.
Nondiscretionary threshold requirements could consist of a single
set, as in the Justice Department and Kastenmeier proposals calling for
twenty-five victims each with injuries exceeding $10,000.'12 Or instead,
a middle range of somewhat smaller cases might not be excluded en-
tirely; rather, parties in such actions could be allowed to invoke the
jurisdiction upon additional showings of need. The result would be a
three-tier system with quite large cases qualifying automatically, me-
dium-sized ones needing special showings, and small cases being ex-
cluded. For example, if such a limitation were not too administratively
cumbersome, it might be desirable to require plaintiffs seeking to in-
voke the jurisdiction-at least in cases not involving many plaintiffs-to
show why they could not bring the entire action in a single forum else-
where.'"" Similarly, a defendant in a middle-range case might have the
right to invoke the jurisdiction by removal, upon actually being sued in
STUDY, supra note 9, at 29, 213-15 (proposing to codify judicial discretion in pendent
jurisdiction cases).
112 See H.R. 4315, supra note 10, § 3; H.R. 3690, supra note 10, § 4; 1979
House Hearings, supra note 12, at 158 (Justice Department proposal).
113 An illustrative type of case in which plaintiffs could show such reasons would
be one in which the constitutional limits delineated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), placed some defendants out of the reach of the only
state court in which other defendants could be sued.
A danger of such threshold requirements, of course, is too much threshold litiga-
tion. Although we would hope that routine motion practice under Rule 12 could handle
such matters without undue complication and expense, we have no strong views on
whether the particular threshold requirement mentioned in the text should be part of a
new federal jurisdiction. In contrast to the definitional issues discussed in Part III, in
which we argued that one particular approach was clearly preferable, we regard most
of the issues addressed in Part IV as ones for political judgments. Congress could, if it
saw too great a danger of threshold litigation, keep the number and complexity of
threshold barriers at a minimum.
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different courts.114 The resulting structure would offer opportunities to
invoke the jurisdiction to both plaintiffs and defendants under not en-
tirely overlapping circumstances but with the distinctions existing to
respond to the degree of need for the federal multiparty, multiforum
jurisdiction.
1 15
114 No hermetic division between plaintiffs and defendants could or should be
fully maintained. Parties in complex litigation will sometimes be plaintiffs on one claim
and defendants on another. Even a party making no claims for conventional relief
might be a declaratory judgment or interpleader plaintiff. The sensible approach to
such cases seems to be to allow removal to federal court under a multiparty, multiforum
jurisdiction if a proper plaintiff in one forum finds itself a proper defendant on the
same matter in another forum.
In addition, because parties can be adversely affected by dispersion of litigation
when they are brought in as third-party defendants or by other joinder after initial
filing, the present practice in many federal courts, allowing removal only by original
defendants, would have to be changed for a multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction. See
generally IA J. MOORE, B. RINGLE & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.167[10] (2d ed. 1985) (discussing third-party claims and problems with removal).
The text does not consider the possibility of allowing removal if different defend-
ants in related cases were sued in different courts. One passenger or survivor might sue
the airline in one state while another sued the airplane manufacturer elsewhere. Re-
moval for consolidation in the federal court system in such cases could be provided for
if it were thought desirable, although it appears less crucial than if the same defendant
faces scattered litigation. Conflicting factual findings, although not as intolerable as
conflicting obligations, are more undesirable if reached about the same party than
about different parties. It is also more reasonable to expect a single party to recognize
and respond to the existence of scattered litigation than to expect two different compa-
nies' legal departments to get in touch with each other. Given the need for some time
limit on removal, cf 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982) (30 days), making defendants eligible
to remove because someone else was sued and then telling them they had become ineli-
gible because they did not learn of the other action in time would be unreasonable.
115 If the proposed jurisdiction sketched in the text seems already too much like a
Rube Goldberg contraption, we ask for the reader's patience. Given the problems being
addressed, a degree of complexity is inevitable. Nonetheless, the basic structure is rela-
tively straightforward: automatic qualification for bigger cases that seem by their na-
ture highly likely to lead to scattered litigation, and screening for need in smaller cases
(down to some minimum, large enough to keep out minor matters). Plaintiffs in such
smaller cases could demonstrate need by showing inevitability of scattering and defend-
ants by pointing to its actuality. For illustrations of how the jurisdiction could work on
the facts of two actual cases, see infra text accompanying notes 139-50. Moreover, a
concern for complexity in a new jurisdiction should not blind us-as sheer habituation
to the status quo may do-to the many arcane, pointless, and obscure complexities of
existing practice under the general diversity jurisdiction. For a discussion of some of
these problems, see Currie, supra note 28; Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction:
Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963
(1979). By contrast, any complex requirements of a new jurisdiction would serve a
coherent and important purpose.
The basic structure we are suggesting could actually minimize the incidence of
maneuver and purely procedural litigation. Larger cases eligible for automatic qualifi-
cation will often involve scattered defendants anyway, making defendant-shopping
ploys to ensure or prevent eligibility superfluous. Cases near the scale borderline would
not be totally excluded because they might still qualify on a showing of need; the ab-
sence of automatic disqualification would reduce the consequences of failure to satisfy
large-case scale requirements, making the issue of their satisfaction less crucial. Plain-
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C. Joinder
Once the jurisdiction itself is defined, a basic choice is whether to
force the joinder of all possible related litigation when the jurisdiction is
invoked. The alternative is to leave the extent of joinder primarily to
the initiative of the parties. In the case of plaintiffs, the extent of join-
der will depend on whether they bring suit at all, with what co-plain-
tiffs, and whom they choose to name as defendants within the federal
jurisdiction. Defendants' influence on joinder will depend mainly on
their exercise of the rights to remove and seek consolidation. If a party
not joined appears to be necessary under federal procedural rules, 1 6
then once part of the case is in federal court it should be possible for
joinder to proceed under Rule 19 as it now stands. As long as the stat-
ute creating the jurisdiction includes sufficiently broad provisions for
process, venue, and transfer, " joinder of indispensable and necessary
absentees who could be found and had minimum contacts with the
United States should be easy. Indeed, within the new jurisdiction, fed-
eral courts should rarely have to undertake the difficult analysis now
required when a Rule 19(a) party cannot be joined. " 8 The legislation
creating the new jurisdiction should eliminate two of the main reasons
why joinder is often impossible at present: incomplete diversity and in-
adequacy of process provisions.
Beyond Rule 19(a) parties, however, are others whose joinder
would be possible but not essential. If their joinder were left to party
initiative, to some extent the purpose of the jurisdiction could be de-
feated-scattered litigation could continue, simultaneously or through
tiffs in smaller cases trying to show need for federal jurisdiction, but having engaged in
questionable joinder, would risk weakening their own position. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1359
(1982) (denying federal jurisdiction in cases of improper or collusive joinder). Defend-
ants actually facing scattered litigation should have no need to use questionable tactics.
Finally, one form of "maneuver" would be far from objectionable: if plaintiffs in a
smaller case wanted to keep a case in state court, they could "collude" to bring it
there-thus assuring a single forum, the purpose of this new jurisdiction.
116 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
117 Several such provisions, which seem to present no great complexity, in addition
to those discussed in the text would have to be part of a statute creating a multiparty,
multiforum jurisdiction. Discussion of them here probably would be more tedious than
informative; we include them, along with brief commentary, in our proposed draft stat-
ute contained in the Appendix.
118 See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
108-09 (1968) (recognizing a court's difficulty in deciding to dismiss an action in the
absence of a person who "should be joined if feasible" or to proceed without that per-
son); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) and advisory committee's notes (1966) (when 19(a)
joinder is not feasible, court must consider four factors listed in 19(b)-prejudice to
absent party, possibility of lessening such prejudice, adequacy of judgment in absence of
party, and adequacy of plaintiff's remedy in case of dismissal-to determine whether in
equity and good conscience, it should dismiss that action or allow it to proceed).
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the filing of later actions. Although dispersion of related litigation stems
from scatter among forums (geographically or systemically as between
federal and state systems), scatter in time, or both, our primary focus is
the definition of a federal jurisdiction to deal with litigation scattered
among forums. A jurisdiction defined as we suggest should be able to
accommodate either permissive or mandatory approaches to issues of
joinder in order to deal with geographical and temporal scatter. We
will, however, offer some observations on the considerations that might
appropriately influence responses to these problems.
As for litigation scattered among forums at the same time, we
favor leaving joinder to party initiative. If the system offers parties the
chance to invoke a federal action-consolidating jurisdiction, but they
prefer to exercise their forum and joinder choices in favor of scattered
litigation, that is their right. This conclusion seems particularly justi-
fied if the jurisdiction provides for defendants to remove and seek con-
solidation whenever they face the actuality of scattered litigation com-
ing within the terms of the federal jurisdiction. Defendants will have
the power to keep scattered litigation from being imposed on them and,
presumably, in most cases will use it. If, for whatever reason, a defend-
ant is content to face litigation in multiple forums, there is no strong
reason to oblige the federal courts to override the forum choices of the
parties themselves." 9 This view is not, of course, the only plausible
one; Professor McCoid, for instance, tentatively inclined in the interest
of judicial economy to favor court authority to insist upon mandatory
joinder although "the parties are indifferent or even opposed to it."' 2 °
Again, our basic jurisdictional definition could accommodate whichever
approach were deemed preferable.
Litigation scattered in time introduces additional factors that make
the case against overriding party preferences stronger, at least as far as
119 The reasons for litigants' mutual choices in favor of scattered but smaller pro-
ceedings are often good ones, such as a preference for greater control and less complex-
ity in individual cases. When both sides seem to share a preference not to invoke an
action-consolidating federal jurisdiction, it is all the more probable that such reasons
underlie their forum choices and that the system should respect those choices. See, e.g.,
In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906,
910 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977) (the unanimous opposition of the parties to transfer, though
not by itself determinative, "is a very persuasive factor in our decision to deny transfer
. ... "). See generally D. HERR, supra note 26, §§ 5.6.3, 5.7.4 (the views of the
parties are a factor in deciding whether transfer is appropriate, and unanimous opposi-
tion of the parties militates strongly against transfer). Additionally 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)
(1982) requires that the transfer be "for the convenience of the parties and witnesses."
Transfer over the objection of all parties would probably not be for their convenience.
12o McCoid, supra note 32, at 728; cf. Mullenix, supra note 51, at 1066-68 (for
proposed mass-tort class action act, suggesting mandatory joinder but with opt-in or
opt-out requirements).
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the working of a federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction is con-
cerned. Mandatory joinder of a prospective plaintiff who has not cho-
sen to bring suit gives a defendant, in effect, the right to seek a declara-
tory judgment of nonliability. 2 ' That may or may not be a good idea:
Mandatory joinder of prospective plaintiffs can be advantageous in that
it consolidates cases and prevents relitigation of the same issues; it may
be disadvantageous in forcing litigation of claims that might otherwise
remain dormant. But regardless of the view taken toward such
mandatory joinder, whether or not to allow it is a question of substan-
tive import. At least for state law claims, we suggest that a federal
action-consolidating jurisdiction should go only so far as to make possi-
ble the joinder of cases brought under existing substantive and proce-
dural law.
D. Choice of Law
Some of the thorniest issues in both the framing and the operation
of a federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction may arise from choice
of law problems. Because the cases would all be multistate by defini-
tion, a great many would require choices among possibly applicable
and conflicting state or even foreign law rules. As have others treating
similar problems, we favor a federalized choice of law regime. Before
we explain our reasons, however, some background may be useful on
choice of law doctrines for federal courts applying state law.
The starting point on federal court choice of state law is Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 2' which held that in diver-
sity cases a federal court must follow the conflicts law of the forum
state. 23 While often criticized,124 this rule has a good deal to recom-
mend it, particularly when a federal court is primarily acting as an-
other court of the state, as is true in diversity cases. It furthers the
policy of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins'25 of preventing federal diver-
sity jurisdiction from erecting a different regime of substantive law
available to those who can get into federal court. The rule also discour-
ages intrastate (between federal and state court) forum shopping,
121 See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.24, at 636 (3d
ed. 1985) (action seeking declaratory judgment of nonliability is available in some cir-
cumstances to defendants facing multiple claims, but is rarely used).
122 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
12' See also Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per
curiam) (summarily reaffirming Klaxon in an extreme case in which forum state's
conflicts law appeared to require application of Cambodian substantive law).
124 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 70, § 57, at 369; sources cited in id. at 369
n.24.
125 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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though interstate forum-shopping possibilities will always exist
whatever the policy of the federal courts."'
Yet merely because a federal court applies the law of a state does
not necessarily mean that it is largely acting as a surrogate state court.
The federal court plays a different role, for example, if federal statu-
.tory interpleader serves its original purpose of providing a forum when
no state court can bring all the scattered claimants together, or if a
multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction provides an otherwise unavailable
single forum. In such situations, the Klaxon rule is subject to serious
criticism for creating the possibility of applying to some litigants a sub-
stantive state law regime that could not, but for the federal jurisdiction,
have governed them-much the sort of thing Erie meant to avoid. It
makes little sense to oblige the federal court to follow the conflicts law
of a state in whose courts it might not even have been possible to bring
the case.
127
In addition, the unavailability of a single state forum in some fed-
eral statutory interpleader situations reduces the possibility of "verti-
cal" intrastate forum shopping between federal and state courts; a simi-
lar condition would often exist in cases under a multiparty, multiforum
jurisdiction as well. Yet tying choice of law to local rules, as Klaxon
does, makes possible "horizontal" forum shopping among federal courts
in different states that would not take place under a uniform federal
approach. For these reasons, commentators have reacted with unani-
mous hostility to the Supreme Court's seemingly uncritical extension of
the Klaxon rule to statutory interpleader in a companion case to
Klaxon itself, Griffin v. McCoach.28 For the same reasons, the ALI
proposal was on firm ground when it suggested a federalized choice of
law regime for its proposed dispersed necessary parties jurisdiction:
"Whenever State law supplies the rule of decision on an issue, the dis-
trict court may make its own determination as to which State rule of
decision is applicable." '12 9 Similarly, these arguments support federal-
126 Cf Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 715 n.125
(1974) (given possibilities of "horizontal uniformity among all federal courts and verti-
cal uniformity between the federal and state courts of a given state[,] ... the promo-
tion of one kind of uniformity inevitably sacrifices the other . . ").
127 See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 78, at 528 (to do so might extend "the law of
the state where the court is located to persons over whom that state has no
jurisdiction").
128 313 U.S. 498 (1941). For examples of the critical commentary, see 3A J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 22.14151, at 22-138 to -140 (2d
ed. 1986); 7 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 69, § 1713, at 579-80;
Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 874, 924-26 (1958).
129 ALI STUDY, supra note 9, at 73 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2374(c)); see also id.
at 402-04 (commentary on proposal), 442-48 (memorandum supporting constitutional-
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ized choice of law in a multiparty, multiforum federal jurisdiction.
For such a jurisdiction, however, the situation would be more
complex than under the ALI proposal. That proposal's narrowness, re-
quiring a finding that the necessary parties were "not all amenable to
process of any one territorial jurisdiction,"13 meant that cases within
its scope could not have been brought before any single state court. We
are considering a broader jurisdiction that would include some cases
that might have been brought in one state court, but could use the fed-
eral forum either because their scale made it unlikely that the parties
would agree on a state forum or because scattered litigation had actu-
ally arisen, perhaps in different state courts."3 In such cases it might
be unfair to deprive a plaintiff of the law whose application she had
"earned" by a proper filing in state court.1 32 Given the large numbers
of parties, original filings and cross-filings in various state and federal
courts, removals, transfers, and remands, conflicts problems could be
numerous and exquisitely difficult. This complexity, however, probably
says more about the state of conflicts doctrine than about the feasibility
of an action-consolidating jurisdiction."3
For such a federal jurisdiction, the resolution of these complexities
may lie in federalized choice of law with authorization to the federal
courts to develop special choice of law principles for cases within the
jurisdiction. At the same time, Congress might include either in legisla-
tive history or in the statutory text factors that federal courts should
consider in making their conflicts decisions. 1 3  Such a listing of factors
would avoid the rigidity and unsatisfactory results that might flow from
ity of independent federal court choice of law).
0SO Id. at 67 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2371(a)).
131 See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
693 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1982) (scattered litigation in various state as well as fed-
eral courts), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
132 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2980 (1985) ("When
considering fairness in [the] context [of interstate law choice], an important element is
the expectation of the parties."). But see Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and
Transfers Within the Federal judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 696-701 (1984)
(arguing that concerns underlying venue provisions have little connection to factors that
should influence conflicts decisions).
133 Cf. Abrams, supra note 78, at 53-54 (although possible changes in federal
jurisdiction "will require abandonment if no choice of law rule can prevent conse-
quences so harmful as to outweigh the benefits,... adoption of a federal choice of
law rule applicable in all cases is not .so unattractive as to scuttle the whole enterprise
of altering federal assertions of judicial power"). Nor should it be assumed that con-
flicts problems would always be tortuously complex; often in mass tort cases, "the court
may find . . . that the same law governs all cases .... " MANUAL, supra note 26, §
33.23, at 297.
134 Cf. ALI STUDY, supra note 9, at 403-04 (discussing factors that should influ-
ence federal law choice under ALI's proposed jurisdiction).
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legislative efforts at simply prescribing governing conflicts law. A non-
exhaustive list of relevant factors would include: unfairness to litigants
through change in law following change in forum; the forums in which
the litigation was or might have been brought, the interests underlying
their respective policies, and whether their conflicts rules might all have
yielded the same substantive law; and the danger of creating incentives
for undesirable forum shopping through differences in substantive
law.3
8 5
The 1979 Justice Department proposal provided for federalized
choice of law rules, but only in part: if a case within the multiparty,
multiforum jurisdiction were one in which a transfer between federal
courts had taken place to consolidate the litigation, then the transferee
court would determine the source of the applicable law, with the same
substantive law to govern both transferred cases and those originally
filed in the transferee court.' No such provision was made for cases
originally filed within the jurisdiction. There appears to be no reason
for the transferred-original distinction, and even the same-law provision
is open to question. Uniformity of applicable law is certainly desira-
ble; 1 7 it could be an additional factor for a federal court to consider
seriously in making choice of law decisions. An inflexible rule requir-
ing it, however, ignores possible reasons for differences in governing
law. Such reasons include the possible legitimacy of expected applica-
tion of the law governing in the state courts where an action was prop-
erly filed and the avoidance of incentives to dispute transfers because of
possible changes in governing law.""8
"' For arguments that in some mass tort cases the federal courts should develop
and apply substantive federal common law, see Mullenix, supra note 51, at 1077-79 &
n.201; Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or a New
Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 167 (1985). Nothing in this
article precludes this possibility should Congress or the federal courts find the argu-
ments for it persuasive.
Even short of a substantive federal common law, the debates among conflicts schol-
ars about the exact content of a federalized law choice regime would no doubt be in-
tense; this article with its primarily jurisdictional focus is not the place to attempt to
resolve them. For our purposes, it suffices to note the reasons why the Griffin require-
ment of following forum state conflicts rules should not govern. Beyond that, disagree-
ments might be so fierce that the best approach would be simply to authorize the fed-
eral courts to develop a decisional conflicts law for cases within the jurisdiction. For
further discussion of the issues involved in framing a federal conflicts statute for such a
jurisdiction, see Miller & Crump, supra note 72, at 78-79.
138 See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 159 (proposed amendments to 28
U.S.C. § 1407). The 1983 and 1986 Kastenmeier bills have contained the same provi-
sion. See H.R. 4315, supra note 10, § 3(c); H.R. 3690, supra note 10, § 4(c).
137 Cf, e.g., R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, supra note 79, at 327 (1985) (asking
whether uniform rule could solve law choice problems in complex cases).
"" An additional reason for not insisting on uniform law would arise in cases like
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), in which part of a
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The 1979 proposal's distinction in conflicts treatment between
cases involving and not involving transfers seems quite arbitrary and
unjustifiable. There is no apparent reason why the lack of need for
transfer should leave the Klaxon rule governing in a case that was im-
possible to bring in the courts of the forum state. The distinction could,
in addition, create incentives for procedural maneuver and litigation
over transfer issues inspired by law change possibilities. Federalized
choice of law in a multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction should thus ap-
ply to all cases properly within the jurisdiction.
E. Two Examples: Tashire and the Skywalk Litigation
To demonstrate the basic workings of the proposed federal juris-
diction, we apply its principles to the facts of two cases familiar to
many. The first illustration is State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tas-
hire,"'9 the Supreme Court decision that clipped the wings of federal
statutory interpleader as an action-consolidating device. The case arose
out of a bus-truck collision in northern California, with at least thirty-
six potential plaintiffs in the bus. Eleven of the potential plaintiffs were
Canadians, and the rest were citizens of five American states. One Ca-
nadian and one American passenger were killed; thirty-three passen-
gers and the bus driver, a citizen of Oregon, were injured. The driver
of the truck and its passenger-owner, both Oregonians, were also in-
jured. State Farm, the truck driver's insurer, was an Illinois corpora-
tion; Greyhound Lines, owner of the bus, was incorporated in
California.' 4°
If all defendants had been Californians, then because the accident
occurred there as well, under our proposal (assuming for the moment
the abolition of general diversity) the California state courts would have
been the only possible forum, despite the several citizenships among the
potential plaintiffs. But because the actual case involved both multistate
defendants and an event occurring in a state (California) other than
that of the residence of some appropriate defendants (Oregon, and
probably Illinois as well), plus a large number of plaintiffs seriously
dispute could have been brought in the courts of the forum state and part could not.
For the part that could not have been brought there, scant reason might support the
application of forum state law. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Yet for the
part that could have been brought there, especially if the event and defendant were
local (such as an in-state driver of the other car), application of any law other than that
of the forum state would make even less sense. But see 1979 House Hearings, supra
note 12, at 161 (Justice Department analysis of proposed jurisdiction, arguing for uni-
formity in applicable law to avoid possible inconsistent adjudications on merits).
1-- 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
140 See id. at 525.
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injured or claiming for others deceased, it would have been an ideal
case for initial invocation of federal multiparty, multistate jurisdiction
by any appropriate plaintiff. In the actual litigation, four injured pas-
sengers brought suit in California state court against all the likely de-
fendants except State Farm. If everyone were content to conduct the
action there, both present federal jurisdiction and our proposed multi-
state forum would, of course, allow that. Given the scale of the poten-
tial litigation, however, it would also have been a logical candidate for
removal by any defendant from California state to California federal
court under a federal multiforum jurisdiction.14
The actual litigation at first remained in the California state court.
State Farm, the Illinois insurer, which had a relatively small policy
insuring the Oregon truck driver for bodily injury liability, then
brought a federal statutory interpleader action in Oregon against all
claimants in order to determine and limit its liability.1 42 At that point,
if the entire case were not already in federal court, under a multiparty,
multiforum jurisdiction at least the truck owner and the driver (now
facing suit in California state court and Oregon federal court on the
same occurrence) would be able to remove the California case to federal
court there. The truck owner and driver could then seek and almost
certainly obtain consolidation of the two proceedings, with the com-
bined litigation most likely assigned to the federal district embracing
the site of the accident. If severance of any individual claims or of dam-
age determinations after pretrial proceedings or liability rulings were
called for, the federal court should have authority to take such steps,
including remanding to state courts in which cases had been properly
brought. This overall approach could bring the federal system much
nearer than it is today to solving "the vexing problems of multiparty
litigation arising out of a mass tort."'
43
The more recent skywalk litigation provides arn opportunity to
view the possible workings of a multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction
from several angles. After the collapse in 1981 of the skywalks in the
Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel, which killed more than a hundred
141 In a multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction even home-state corporation Grey-
hound should be able to remove, although it could not do so under the present diversity
jurisdiction even if there were complete diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) (for-
bidding removal in diversity cases if any defendant properly joined and served is forum
state citizen). Since the common rationale for diversity jurisdiction is the protection of
out-of-staters from home-court bias, the present removal ban has some logic. But, be-
cause the concern underlying the proposed jurisdiction is not prejudice against outsid-
ers, but rather the prevention of scattered litigation, the prohibition on removal by
home staters should not apply to cases within the proposed jurisdiction.
142 Tashire, 386 U.S. at 525-26.
148 Id. at 535.
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people and injured over two hundred others, plaintiffs filed numerous
state law claims in Missouri state court and a smaller number in Mis-
souri federal court."" The state and federal courts cooperated for a
time in managing the litigation; however, the federal district court then
attempted full consolidation by certifying a class action, 1 5 which froze
the state court proceedings for six months.14 The Eighth Circuit re-
versed because it viewed the federal court's action as constituting an
injunction against state proceedings in violation of the federal anti-in-
junction act.147 Litigation then continued in both forums, with a mix-
ture of intersystem cooperation and conflict.14 Eventually, class settle-
ments (after the Eighth Circuit reversal, the federal district court
certified a nonmandatory class) were reached in both state and federal
courts.
1 49
Under the new federal jurisdiction, split litigation over the
skywalks disaster could have been avoided whether the present diversity
jurisdiction survived or not. With general diversity continued, the mini-
mal diversity feature of the new jurisdiction would have permitted non-
diverse plaintiffs to join in bringing the action in federal court and de-
fendants to remove from state court if sued there. (Were any actions
filed in the courts of other states, defendants already sued in the main
144 See Morris & See, The Hyatt Skywalks Litigation: The Plaintiffs' Perspective,
52 UMKC L. REV. 246, 246, 254 (1984) (stating that there were a total of 18 cases on
.file in federal court in late 1981, as compared to the 100 to 200 cases pending in state
court at various times. Because both Missouri and Kansas corporations were potential
defendants, the great majority of victims, residents of Missouri or Kansas, lacked the
requisite diversity of citizenship for federal court jurisdiction, so that only state court
was open to them.).
I'l See id. at 254, 259-60 (stating that cooperation through a joint plaintiffs' liai-
son committee permitted "a massive discovery effort ... applicable to all cases in both
courts" for the first six months of the litigation until the federal court certified a
mandatory class action in January 1982).
140 See id. at 260. The authors note:
The certification of the mandatory class created a permanent and
sometimes bitter division between the federal court and the overwhelming
majority of skywalks victims whose cases were pending in state court. Be-
cause of the federal court's action, state court plaintiffs could neither settle
nor continue the massive discovery activity conducted during the previous
six months. Their attorneys, who had spent thousands of hours reviewing
documents and preparing for depositions, suddenly had no role in deter-
mining how discovery or a trial on behalf of their clients would be con-
ducted. Attorneys who represented a total of two victims now controlled
the litigation.
Id.
147 In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1181-83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 988 (1982).
I48 See Morris & See, supra note 144, at 263-71; Student Project, A Case Study
in Mass Disaster Litigation, 52 UMKC L. REv. 151, 167-72 (1984).
149 See Morris & See, supra note 144, at 267-71.
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federal action could remove and seek transfer for consolidation with the
main action.) And with general diversity abolished, assuming that the
claims were under state law, they might all have been brought in Mis-
souri state court, in which case no dispersion problem would arise. If
some plaintiffs sued in the courts of other states, the defendants sued in
both forums could then remove all cases from state to federal courts and
seek their consolidation.15 The unification of the litigation in one fo-
rum, state or federal, should prevent many of the problems that arose
in the actual skywalk cases, and it would permit a single court to con-
sider class treatment free from concern over the impact of certification
on proceedings in other forums.
V. RELATION TO EXISTING FEDERAL JURISDICTIONS
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Our discussion thus far has focused on scattered litigation
problems arising in state law or diversity cases. But just as an ordinary
federal question case today may happen also to satisfy the requirements
for diversity jurisdiction, dispersed federal question actions could simi-
larly meet the criteria for the new federal jurisdiction. If and only if
such a case did so, it could qualify for the new jurisdiction and make
use of its provisions without regard to the source or sources of law upon
which the claims in the case rested. If the new jurisdiction were defined
with a careful eye to the purpose of a federal action-consolidating de-
vice-making it possible to gather scattered, related litigation-the sub-
stantive law involved should be irrelevant to the availability of the fed-
eral forum. If a federal question case did not satisfy the criteria, it
would not have enough need for the new jurisdiction; if it did meet the
jurisdictional standards, it could use the mechanisms afforded by the
jurisdiction regardless of its federal question nature.
A precedent for such an approach to federal question matters is
the current section 1407 of the Judicial Code, which authorizes transfer
for pretrial proceedings in civil actions involving common questions of
fact pending in different federal districts. Such transfers are available
without regard to the source of the right claimed and are used in diver-
sity and federal question matters alike.' 5 ' To a considerable extent, ex-
150 If the filings were mostly in the courts of one state, some provision perhaps
should be made for discretionary remand of the entire consolidated action to that state's
courts.
151 See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 581 F. Supp. 739 (J.P.M.D.L.
1984) (consolidating annuity purchasers' actions alleging fraud and federal and state
securities laws violations); In re Air Crash Disaster at Covington, Kentucky, on June
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isting section 1407, especially if used in combination with authority
under section 1404 to transfer some cases for trial, handles for federal
question cases the problems to which our proposal responds. It cannot
do so entirely, however, at least for federal question cases over which
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Even if section 1407 were ex-
panded to allow for trial as well as pretrial proceedings, as long as it
remains the rule that all defendants must join in a removal petition
under section 1441 152 some defendants may find themselves stuck in
state courts even though they face scattered federal question claims and
wish to remove. The primary need for a multiparty, multiforum juris-
diction, of course, exists in state law matters, which can sometimes be
brought only in state courts or-given the present structure of the gen-
eral diversity jurisdiction-must be split between state and federal
courts.
B. General Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction
Those who favor retaining the present general diversity jurisdic-
tion sometimes contend that it plays the sort of role we propose for a
federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction, by making possible at least
2, 1983, 579 F. Supp. 1057 (J.P.M.D.L. 1984) (consolidating actions, many against
Air Canada by Americans so diversity jurisdiction presumably was present, arising out
of an in-flight fire); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 568 F.
"Supp. 1250 (.P.M.D.L. 1983) (consolidating securities laws actions). See generally D.
HERR, supra note 26, § 5.4.2 (canvassing types of cases transferred, including matters
mainly governed by federal law such as securities, antitrust, patent, labor, and discrimi-
nation actions, and litigation commonly under state law such as mass torts and products
liability cases).
Because § 1407 authorizes consolidation of cases involving common questions of
fact without the further relatedness requirement that they arise out of the same transac-
tion or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences, its coverage goes beyond
what we suggest for a new federal jurisdiction. The existing provision thus would not
be entirely superseded by our proposal. Indeed, § 1407 may bear expanding beyond its
present availability for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Representative
Kastenmeier also introduced in 1983 a bill that would permit transferee courts to retain
transferred actions for determinations of liability and, upon findings of convenience for
parties and service to the interests of justice, damages as well. H.R. 4159, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983).
152 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 70, § 40, at 227. For a multiparty, mul-
tiforum jurisdiction this rule would have to be abandoned. Permitting a single defend-
ant who prefers state court to bar removal by other defendants facing scattered litiga-
tion would defeat the purposes of the jurisdiction. Severance and remand as to
defendants who did not join in removing, if the whole action rather than just claims
against a removing defendant were removed, might remain in the discretion of the fed-
eral courts after removal. Precedent for not applying the all-defendants requirement to
situations in which it conflicts with apparent congressional intent exists in practice
under the separate claim removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982). See 14A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3731, at
507-08 n.9 (2d ed. 1985).
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consolidated pretrial proceedings via the use of section 1407 when di-
versity cases are initially dispersed among federal courts. 5 ' The argu-
ment is that the valuable function of permitting consolidation of related
state law cases scattered among federal courts in litigation over such
matters as airline crashes, now performed by the diversity jurisdiction,
would be lost if it were abolished. 154 The point is technically correct as
far as it goes, but it could fairly count against abolition only if diversity
were not replaced with a jurisdiction that would itself permit the same
or greater consolidation. The argument also ignores the extent to which
present diversity jurisdiction fails to serve its ostensible purposes and, in
fact, is part of the scattered litigation problem.
155
Practitioners understandably find attractive the forum choices and'
possibilities for maneuvering that diversity jurisdiction creates. A
rationalized federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction, however, offers
much that the bar-not to mention the clients it serves-should find
attractive as a supplement to or replacement for general diversity. The
assurance of being able to bring a complex case in or remove it to an
action-consolidating federal forum, instead of having to worry about a
litigation split among several courts with the dangers of inconsistency
and greater expense, should be of great value. Even if general diversity
were abolished, many cases that now come within that jurisdiction
would still come under a multiparty, multiforum provision-in full,
rather than in part, as is often the case today. Those cases that now
come before federal courts because of diversity but that would no longer
qualify for the federal forum upon its abolition would usually be proce-
durally simpler matters that have the very least need to be in federal
18 See, e.g., Mullenix & Shepherd, For the Retention of Diversity Jurisdiction,
65 A.B.A. J. 860, 860 (1979) (arguing that abolition or curtailment of diversity juris-
diction would result in the loss of "the machinery available under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for
pretrial consolidation of multidistrict litigation involving mass disasters ... when di-
versity is the only basis for federal jurisdiction.").
184 See Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction-1982: Hearing on H.R. 6691
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 123, 126 (1982) (letter from
Robert D. Evans to Chairman Robert W. Kastenmeier); 1979 Senate Hearings, supra
note 12, at 166 (statement of Prof. John Reed); Mullinix & Shepherd, supra note 153.
But cf. Schroeder, supra note 61 (suggesting state laws providing for interstate transfer
and pretrial consolidation of related cases pending in different states).
10 See supra text acompanying notes 64-68.
In the interest of full disclosure, we should perhaps mention that the senior co-
author of this article has previously advocated the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. See
1979 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 72-94 (testimony of Prof. Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr.); Rowe, supra note 65; Rowe, supra note 115. The desirability of a federal action-
consolidating jurisdiction, however, is a separate question; general diversity could either
coexist with or be replaced by the new jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes
156-57.
[Vol. 135:7
MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION
court.
Should these benefits of a new multiparty, multiforum provision
not be enough to warrant abolition of diversity, the proposed jurisdic-
tion would still be well worth adopting alongside existing general diver-
sity. The continuation of diversity should pose no unique or insupera-
ble problems for a new jurisdiction; the additional provision could,
indeed, deal well with the splitting of cases between federal and state
courts that diversity jurisdiction now intensifies. A defendant sued by a
cocitizen in state court and on a related matter by an out-of-stater in
federal court would have the right to remove and join the cases in fed-
eral court.'5' The expansion of federal jurisdiction would give cause for
some concern about docket congestion, but most of the time a mul-
tiparty, multiforum provision should add only parties to a litigation
part of which would already be before federal courts under diversity
jurisdiction. And finally, the occasion of creating a new jurisdiction
might be the moment for a long-overdue increase in the amount in con-
troversy required for general diversity cases. 
5
7
CONCLUSION
The proposal for a federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction at-
tempts to meet a growing need to deal with problems of scattered litiga-
tion. The Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
.v. Woodson'58 has heightened that need by making it clear that state
court systems lack constitutional authority to respond adequately to the
problem. The benefits of such a jurisdictional measure should have
broad appeal, for use of the federal forum to deal with scattered litiga-
tion is an appropriate expenditure of a uniquely federal resource."5 9
15' Such a provision would reduce the effect of the complete diversity rule by per-
mitting eventual consolidation of incomplete diversity cases in federal court. It would
not, however, negate the thrust of the complete diversity rule. To begin with, if removal
were allowed only when the same defendant faced related claims in different forums,
cases involving a single plaintiff claiming against more than one defendant would not
be affected. Normally, such a plaintiff could still bring and keep a multidefendant case
together in state court or split the litigation between state and federal courts without
possibility of removal by the state court defendants, as is most often true today. In a
multiplaintiff incomplete diversity case, if the plaintiffs wanted to avoid giving the de-
fendant the tactical advantage of a choice between split litigation and consolidation in
federal court, they would have to join forces and bring all claims in the same state
court, thus unifying the litigation.
"" The last change in the amount in controversy requirement for diversity matters
occurred nearly 30 years ago. In 1958, the minimum amount was raised from $3,000 to
$10,000. See Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. 85-554(a), 72 Stat. 415 (currently codified
as 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)).
158 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
15 Cf H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 149-50 (1973)
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Lawyers should welcome the opportunities made possible by the new
jurisdiction; clients should welcome a reduction of the travails of scat-
tering in addition to the usual burdens of litigation. Academics-and
perhaps even their students-could be pleased with the creation, at long
last, of a rationalized jurisdiction responsive to a coherent need in place
of or alongside the present patchwork. Because the federal courts al-
ready deal with large segments of many scattered proceedings, the
added burden on them should not be major. The new jurisdiction could
actually simplify some complex federal litigation, and the federal
caseload might further be reduced by curtailing or abolishing diversity.
The federal system can do much better than it now does with the prob-
lem of scattered litigation; a new federal jurisdiction should be part of
the solution.
(supporting retention of alienage jurisdiction and statutory interpleader while at the
same time calling for abolition of general diversity jurisdiction as an inappropriate use
of "scant federal judge-power").
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APPENDIX
DRAFT PROVISIONS FOR FEDERAL MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM
JURISDICTION
28 U.S.C.
§ 1367. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of civil ac-
tions arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of re-
lated transactions or occurrences, if:
COMMENT on § 1367(a): The basic phrasing above is taken partly from
the 1979 Justice Department proposal, most readily accessible in 1979
House Hearings, supra note 12, at 158-59, and partly from Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) on permissive joinder. This jurisdic-
tional provision lacks the additional Rule 20(a) joinder requirement of
a common question of law or fact so as to allow broader invocation of
the jurisdiction, with the joinder rules remaining applicable to the
grouping of actions, claims, and parties within the jurisdiction.
(1) any party is a citizen of a State and any adverse party is-
(A) a citizen of another State;
(B) a citizen or subject of a foreign state; or
(C) a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a) of this title;
and
COMMENT on § 1367(a)(1): This subsection simply attempts to put into
statutory language the constitutional minimal diversity requirement,
authorizing exercise of the jurisdiction in all cases in which this re-
quirement (along with those that follow) is satisfied but in no others. In
a very few cases that meet the remaining requirements of draft §
1367(a)-(b), minimal diversity might be lacking. See supra note 89. To
avoid possible unconstitutional applications, this subsection hangs the
statute squarely on its constitutional peg.
(2) (A) any defendant resides in a State and-
(i) a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise
to the action occurred in any other State, even if a sub-
stantial part of such acts or omissions also occurred in
the State where such defendant resides; or
(ii) any other defendant resides in a different State, or
(B) a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to
the action occurred in two or more different States.
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COMMENT on § 1367(a)(2): This subsection, particularly its subpart
(A)(i), embodies the heart of our proposal. It attempts to capture in
statutory form the condition that we argue should be necessary (but not
sufficient) for the exercise of a federal multiparty, multiforum jurisdic-
tion-any defendant's residency in a state other than one in which a
substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the action oc-
curred. Because that condition is covered in subpart (A)(i), for most
purposes subpart (A)(ii) would be superfluous. It is included primarily
for clarity and administrative ease, to make it unnecessary to consider
issues about where events occurred when defendants have residences in
different states and scattered litigation is thus possible. Subpart (A)(ii)
does, however, deal with one situation not covered by subpart (A)(i):
cases in which all events took place abroad but litigation in American
courts is possible because defendants reside in different American
states. For a somewhat converse and probably also unusual situation,
subpart (B) confers subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving non-
resident defendants and events that occurred in two or more American
states.
Reference to a defendant's residence, rather than citizenship, is
necessary for the subsection to encompass United States citizens and
resident aliens alike and also because residence is traditionally one of
the principal factors in the venue statutes determining where suit can
be brought. Residence would thus draw on judicial constructions of that
term in the venue statutes and, for United States citizens, should coin-
cide with state citizenship. Possible multiple residence of corporate de-
fendants should not be a problem because a case involving an event in
one of a corporation's states of residence could still present a threat of
scattered litigation, with the corporation also suable on the event in
another state or states of its residence; such situations would come
within the definition in this subsection. If specific definition of corpo-
rate residence were thought necessary, one approach appears in the
ALI's proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2372(b).
The draft statute deals only with scattered litigation resulting from
dispersed events or defendants. If general diversity jurisdiction is abol-
ished, these situations should be the only sources of scattered litigation.
But diversity jurisdiction makes it possible for litigation to be split ver-
tically between state and federal courts of the same state, even if all
events and defendants are entirely local. Hence, if diversity and the
new jurisdiction were on the books at the same time, a special provision
might be desirable to deal with such vertical dispersion. Such a provi-
sion could be a scattered-victims clause in the original definition of the
jurisdiction, such as that found in the Justice Department and Kas-
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tenmeier proposals. See supra notes 84, 90. Perhaps preferably (to re-
spond only to actual dispersion), it could allow removal even without
original jurisdiction in the special circumstances of vertical split without
scattered events or defendants, provided that the cases satisfied the scale
and minimal diversity requirements of the original dispersed-litigation
jurisdiction.
(b) The jurisdiction created by subsection (a) may be invoked only
[if the action involves claims for personal injury or injury to property
and] in the following circumstances:
COMMENT on § 1367(b): Without further limitation, § 1367(a) could
bring into the federal courts trivial matters and cases in which the dan-
ger of scattered litigation was only theoretical. Because it states the con-
ditions in which such litigation is possible and within the constitutional
authority of the federal courts, however, § 1367(a) could remain un-
changed if other subsections were amended in the future to respond to
experience and the needs of courts and litigants. Section 1367(b) offers
one set of possible limitations within the core definition, drawing on
our suggestion that the jurisdiction be automatically available in large
cases, see infra subsection (1), and in somewhat smaller ones only if
scattered litigation were unavoidable, see infra subsection (2)(A), or
had actually arisen, see infra subsection (2)(B). If coverage of the
somewhat smaller cases were viewed as nonessential or the effort to
take them into federal court irremediably complex, subsection (2) below
could be dropped or amended to include an element of judicial discre-
tion. Reference to types of claims, drawn from the Justice Department
proposal, is bracketed to highlight the policy question whether the ju-
risdiction's definition should include any subject matter limits.
(1) if [the matter in controversy is alleged in good faith to exceed
the sum or value of ($25,000) for each of any (twenty-five) actual
or prospective plaintiffs,] [the sum or value of the injury alleged
in good faith to have been incurred by any (twenty-five) persons
exceeds ($25,000) per person,] exclusive of interest and costs; or
COMMENT on § 1367(b)(1): This subsection is based on the theory that
the jurisdiction should be automatically available in large cases when
scattered litigation is likely or has already arisen. The second bracketed
clause comes from the-Justice Department draft and is preferable if the
jurisdiction is limited to personal injury and property damage cases. If
there is no such limitation, broader phrasing like that in the first brack-
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eted clause-based on present 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)-is necessary.
The somewhat awkward "actual or prospective" phrasing appears es-
sential because none of these proposals mandates joinder of all potential
parties to a multiparty case (Rule 19 requirements aside); the joinder is
instead permissive. Our idea is to make the jurisdiction available in
appropriate cases, at the initiative of any proper plaintiff or plaintiffs,
and then to allow others to join if they wish. The setting of specific
amounts both here and in the following subsection is a matter for polit-
ical judgment and alteration; the amounts are in parentheses to indicate
their tentative nature.
(2) if [the matter in controversy is alleged in good faith to exceed
the sum or value of ($5,000) for each of any (five) actual or pro-
spective plaintiffs,] [the sum or value of the injury alleged in
good faith to have been incurred by any (five) persons exceeds
($5,000) per person,] exclusive of interest and costs, and if
COMMENT on § 1367(b)(2): This subsection makes possible the invoca-
tion of multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction in somewhat smaller cases
than those covered in the previous subsection. This language authorizes
invocation of the jurisdiction in smaller cases at the initiative of plain-
tiffs when scattered litigation is demonstrably inevitable but for the fed-
eral jurisdiction or, primarily at the initiative of defendants, when de-
fendants are actually facing scattered litigation. The availability of the
jurisdiction for such smaller cases is not, in our view, essential, al-
though it is desirable if it can be administered fairly easily.
(A) any plaintiff stating a claim or claims upon which relief
can be granted cannot join all proper parties defendant to
that plaintiff's claim or claims in the courts of any one State,
and can join them in one district court under the provisions of
this title; or
COMMENT on § 1367(b)(2)(A): This subsection attempts to respond to
some situations like the one that would have arisen had the plaintiffs in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980),
wanted to sue a local driver and all the defendants in the actual case in
a single forum, which is not constitutionally possible in any one state
court after that decision. It does not necessarily include all such cases,
depending on the jurisdictional amount and how many actual or pro-
spective plaintiffs are required; requiring more than one or a very few
might be necessary to avoid too-easy invocations of the jurisdiction by
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questionable joinder of scattered defendants by one or a few plaintiffs.
The requirement of possibility of joinder in one federal district court is
meant to limit the exercise of the jurisdiction to cases in which the
federal system can in fact uniquely serve a need and makes implicit
reference to possible use of transfer provisions, see infra § 1407.
(B) any party to a civil action
(i) in the courts of any State is subsequently sued, as an
original defendant or otherwise, in a court of the United
States or of any other State, or (ii) in a court of the United
States is subsequently sued, as an original defendant or
otherwise, in a court of any State,
by a plaintiff stating a claim upon which relief can be granted
and the claim in the second action arises out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of related transactions or oc-
currences at issue in the first action.
COMMENT on § 1367(b)(2)(B): This subsection attempts to deal with
some smaller cases in which a defendant actually faces scattered litiga-
tion. It does not require that such a party be a defendant in all of the
scattered actions, because someone who is properly sued in one forum
might be sued on a related matter in another. It provides for jurisdic-
tion when a party faces dispersed litigation as a result of either being
sued originally or being made a defendant through subsequent joinder
as a third party defendant, additional party defendant to a counter-
claim, etc. The danger of scattered litigation is the same whether the
party facing it is an original or added defendant. Invocation of the ju-
risdiction under this subsection could be at the initiative of any party to
the claim in the second action and would be by means of removal, see
infra § 1441. The reference to "stating a claim upon which relief can
be granted" is meant to avoid too-easy invocation of the jurisdiction by
legally insufficient allegations. It does not appear necessary to deal at
this point with situations involving litigation scattered between two or
more federal courts, since those cases can be handled by means of
transfer under amended § 1407, infra.
(c) When an action within the jurisdiction of the district courts
under this section has been commenced in or removed to any district
court, any person with a claim within the terms of subsection (a) shall
be permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff in such action, notwith-
standing that such person could not have brought an action in a dis-
trict court as an original matter.
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COMMENT on § 1367(c): This subsection is based in part on the 1979
Justice Department proposal. As the commentary to that proposal
pointed out, such a provision is needed because not all plaintiffs who
may join an action within the jurisdiction may initiate one: minimal
diversity is essential, and a plaintiff who has only a state law claim
against a co-citizen may have to wait until someone of diverse citizen-
ship commences a federal action and then intervene or remove a state
court case already filed. This subsection authorizes joinder of all re-
lated matters without regard to jurisdictional amount, contrary to cur-
rent law as enunciated in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S.
291 (1973).
(d) In any action over which the district court has jurisdiction
pursuant to this section, the district court wherein the action is pend-
ing shall promptly notify the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
of the pendency of such action.
COMMENT on § 1367(d): Based on the 1979 Justice, Department
proposal.
§ 1391. Venue generally
(g) A civil action wherein jurisdiction of the district court is based
upon section 1367 of this title may be brought in any district in which
any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the action occurred.
COMMENT on § 1391(g): Based on the 1979 Justice Department
proposal.
§ 1407. Multidistrict litigation
(i) In actions transferred pursuant to the provisions of this sec-
tion when jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on section 1367 of
this title, notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the
transferee district court may retain actions transferred for determina-
tion as to liability. Those actions retained for determination as to lia-
bility shall be remanded to the district courts from which they were
transferred, or to the state courts from which they were removed, for
determination as to damages unless the court finds that for the conve-
nience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice an action
should be retained for determination of damages. Any decision con-
cerning remand for determination as to damages under this subsec-
tion shall not be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
COMMENT on § 1407(i): This subsection is based on the 1979 Justice
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Department proposal, with the addition of possible direct remand to
state courts. Further subsections to § 1407 in that proposal, dealing
with choice of law and subpoena power, are treated elsewhere, see in-
fra §§ 1657, 1785, because of our belief that they should be general
provisions applicable or available however the multiparty, multiforum
jurisdiction is invoked and should not be limited to cases involving
transfers. Existing § 1407(a) gives the multidistrict panel authority to
decide whether or not to order transfer and consolidation, based on its
judgment whether transfers "will be for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such ac-
tions." Consequently, even if a claim were within our proposed juris-
diction, the panel could refuse to transfer it if for some reason-such as
simplicity or tenuous connection to related cases-it appeared better
treated by itself. Concerning unreviewability of decisions whether or
not to remand, see infra comment on § 1441.
§ 1441. Actions removable generally
05 Any party to a claim in an action pending in a State court
that arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of related
transactions or occurrences as an action pending within the jurisdic-
tion of the district courts under section 1367 of this title may remove
that claim to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such claim is pending even if the
claim is not otherwise removable pursuant to this section. When no
such action is pending in a district court, such removal may take place
only if the parties to the state court claim are of minimally diverse
citizenship as defined in section 1367(aX1) of this title. The removal of
a claim pursuant to this subsection shall be made in accordance with
the provisions of section 1446 of this title, except that when a State
court action is begun before the commencement of an action within
section 1367 of this title in any district court of the United States, the
time within which removal shall be made pursuant to section 1446(b)
of this title shall run from the commencement of the action in the dis-
trict court.
Whenever a claim removed to a district court within this subsec-
tion is pending in the district court to which it was removed and a
liability determination requiring further proceedings as to damages
has been reached, the district court shall remand the claim to the state
court from which it had been removed for determination as to damages
unless the court finds that for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and in the interest of justice an action should be retained for determi-
nation of damages. Any decision concerning remand for determina-
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tion as to damages under this subsection shall not be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
COMMENT on § 1441(f): The first two sentences are based in large part
on the 1979 Justice Department proposal. This draft intends to permit
removal both to invoke the multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction (as by a
defendant sued on related matters in the courts of two or more states)
and to join actions within the jurisdiction pending in federal court (as
by a defendant sued in state court after the filing of a federal mul-
tiforum jurisdiction action). General removal practice provides for re-
moval of an entire action, sometimes allowing (in § 1441(c)) for re-
mand of matters not within original federal jurisdiction. Such an
approach would be possible under this jurisdiction, but we prefer re-
movability of individual claims to minimize procedural -shuffle. The fo-
cus on claims rather than actions would also entail abandonment of the
all-defendants requirement for removal, which we regard as a neces-
sary step for this jurisdiction.
The draft allows removal by either plaintiffs or defendants, even if
a plaintiff had a chance to bring a federal action and did not, for vari-
ous reasons: sometimes a plaintiff could not have brought a federal ac-
tion (in the absence of minimal diversity) and may have appropriately
sued in state court, and it might be too cumbersome to sort out cases in
which plaintiffs could and could not readily have sued in federal court.
Also, if removal is of claims rather than of actions, defendants with a
monopoly on the right to remove might try to engage in tactical maneu-
vers involving removal of one claim on which they were sued but not
another. (Removal by plaintiffs would require technical amendments to
several subsections of § 1446.) The draft's "even if not otherwise re-
movable" language would override existing § 1441(b)'s limitation on
removal in diversity cases to those involving no home-state defendants;
since our concern is not prejudice but scattered litigation, the present
limitation is irrelevant.
We include the possibility of discretionary remand (sometimes
called "reverse removal") to state courts for damage determinations af-
ter liability rulings both for federalist reasons of respect for state courts
and to reduce the burden on the federal judiciary. Consolidation might
be important only for the liability stage, and some damage claims ap-
propriately included in a multiparty liability determination could be in
no need of further federal court attention. A district court considering a
remand in these circumstances should take into account such factors as
whether related actions were still pending in state court and the relative
speed and economy with which the actions could be concluded in the
two systems. The exclusion of the possibility of review of the decision
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whether to remand is for reasons of economy. If it were felt that the
consequences of misuse of the remand authority (either way) might be
serious enough to warrant opening the door to a second round on the
point, review could be allowed.
§ 1657. Choice of law in multiparty, multiforum actions
When an action is within the jurisdiction of the district court
under section 1367 of this title, the court shall determine the source or
sources of applicable substantive law. Whenever State law supplies the
rule of decision on an issue, the court may make its own determination
as to which State rule of decision is applicable. [In making this deter-
mination, the factors the court may consider include: the law that
might have governed if the jurisdiction created by section 1367 of this
title did not exist; the forums in which the claims were or might have
been brought; the desirability of application of uniform law to some or
all aspects of the action; whether a change in applicable law in con-
nection with removal or transfer of the action would cause unfairness;
and the danger of creation of unnecessary incentives for forum
shopping.]
COMMENT on § 1657: The first sentence is based in part on the 1979
Justice Department proposal; but in accordance with our argument in
the text of the article, federalized choice of law is the rule for all ac-
tions within the jurisdiction and not just those in which transfer and
consolidation have taken place. The second sentence is taken verbatim
from the ALI's proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2374(c). The third sentence,
bracketed to highlight the possibility of confining such considerations to
legislative history, attempts to provide some guidance without under-
taking the probably impossible task of drafting a complete code of
choice of law principles. Whether such limited guidance could be codi-
fied or even included in legislative history would depend on the level of
consensus about specific choice of law approaches, a matter that is
outside the scope of this article.
§ 1697. Service in multiparty, multiforum actions
When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in whole or in
part upon section 1367 of this title, process, other than subpoenas,
may be served at any place throughout the jurisdiction of the United
States, or anywhere without the United States if otherwise permitted by
law.
COMMENT on § 1697: Based on the 1979 Justice Department proposal.
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§ 1785. Subpoenas in multiparty, multiforum actions
When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in whole or in
part upon section 1367 of this title, if authorized by the court upon
motion for good cause shown, upon such terms and conditions as the
court may impose, a subpoena for attendance at a hearing or trial
may be served at any place within the jurisdiction of the United States,
or anywhere without the United States if otherwise permitted by law.
COMMENT on § 1785: This section is based on the 1979 Justice De-
partment proposal but with availability broadened to all multiparty,
multiforum jurisdiction actions instead of being limited to cases in
which transfer and consolidation had taken place. If the provision is
needed at all, it could be useful in actions entirely filed in or removed
to one district court as well as in those that have been consolidated.
